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The Famine of 1932-33
in the Discussion of Russian-Ukrainian Relations
Frank E. Sysyn
T
he commemoration in 2003 of the seventieth 
anniversary of the Great Ukrainian Famine has 
brought the tragedy to the forefront of Ukrainian 
domestic and foreign affairs. Despite the opposition of 
the Communists and the indifference of much of the 
former Soviet nomenklatura, the parliament passed a 
resolution recognizing the famine as genocide and 
placing blame on the Soviet authorities.1 The Ukrainian 
government had initiated an action in the United Nations 
to recognize the genocidal nature of the famine. Here, 
however, the Russian delegation seems to have opposed 
the Ukrainian initiative behind the scenes. Calls from 
civic organizations, such as Ukraine's Memorial, that 
Moscow issue an acknowledgment and an apology have 
met with dismissal and even derision by the Russian 
ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and by 
Vladimir Putin. As in so many questions of Ukrainian- 
Russian relations, dialogue has not even begun.2
The relatively short time since the fall of the Soviet
Union and the opening up of archival materials explains 
why attention has focused on gathering new evidence and 
studying specific events in Soviet history rather than on 
constructing new syntheses and tackling complex 
abstract issues, such as the nature of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations.3 At the same time, the emergence of
1 On the parliamentary hearings, see Parlamentars'ki slukhannia 
shchodo shanuvannia pam'iati zhertv holodomoru 1932-1933 rokiv 12 
liutoho 2003 r. (Kyiv, 2003).
2 On discussions of international recognition of the Famine as
genocide, see Ukrains'ka pravda www.pravda.com.ua, 25 September 
2003, "Kuchma ziznavsia, shcho ne khoche 'zvodyty rakhunky' za 
Holodomor-33."
3 Some of the questions of Ukrainian-Russian relations in the Soviet
period are addressed in the introduction and essays in Andreas Kappeler,
independent Russian and Ukrainian states has focused 
attention in both states on writing national history rather 
than on re-examining the relations of the two peoples and 
cultures within the Soviet Union. Indeed, the breakdown 
of scholarly contacts and even the exchange of literature 
have discouraged such discussions between what are now 
two historiographies that have developed out of the 
disintegration of Soviet historiography. The remarks that 
follow are intended to raise some of the issues of 
Russian-Ukrainian relations that should be examined in 
discussions of the Famine of 1932-33. They aim to 
provoke discussion rather than to present a hypothesis.
Perhaps no event in Soviet history has been 
transformed as rapidly from a “white spot” into a major 
focus of popular consciousness as the Famine of 1932­
33. In contrast to events such as the purges, the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact, and the Katyn massacre, which have 
long received scholarly and popular attention outside the 
Soviet Union, the Famine had been relatively neglected 
by academics and by the Western public until the 1980s. 
The Famine became a subject of scholarly study and 
public attention in the West largely through the efforts of 
the Ukrainian diaspora communities centering on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Famine in 1983.4 The film, 
Harvest of Despair, the US Congressional Resolution 
and the Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, and the 
International Commission of Enquiry on the Ukrainian
Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen, eds., Culture,
Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600-1945
(Toronto-Edmonton, 2003).
4 Frank E. Sysyn, "The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-3: The Role of the 
Ukrainian Diaspora in Research and Public Discussion," in Levron 
Chorbajian and George Shirinian, Studies in Comparative Genocide 
(New York-London, 1999), 182-215.
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Famine brought the event to public attention. Robert 
Conquest's monograph Harvest of Sorrow and the 
publications of James Mace placed the Famine on the 
Western scholarly agenda.5
The period of glasnost in the USSR permitted the 
Famine issue to emerge among the numerous historical 
revelations and re-evaluations of the late 1980s. The issue 
was first broached in Moscow, but by 1989 it took on 
widespread popular resonance in Ukraine. The public 
manifestations, erection of monuments, international 
conferences, and scholarly publications of the 1990s have 
made the Famine one of the central issues of historical 
discussion in contemporary Ukraine.6
For both the Ukrainian diaspora and the Ukrainian 
national movement in Ukraine, the Famine issue has 
functioned as a rallying point. From the 1930s to the 
1990s, anti-Soviet Ukrainians outside the USSR pointed 
to the Famine as proof of the criminal and anti-Ukrainian 
nature of the Soviet regime. Within these circles, the 
Moscow government held responsible was seen as both 
Communist and Russian. The lesson drawn was that only 
an independent Ukraine would have guaranteed against 
such tragedies and could avoid them in the future. The 
refusal of the Soviet government to admit that a famine 
had occurred, much less to admit that it bore 
responsibility, transformed all discussions of the Famine 
into an ideological confrontation. The issue was 
particularly important in right-left polemics, because if 
the Soviet Union was seen as comparable in evil to Nazi 
Germany, all discussions of the Eastern Front of World 
War II took on a different coloration. At the same time, 
Ukrainians in the diaspora found the Famine an 
important means of questioning the stereotype of 
“Ukrainians” as victimizers (Nazi collaborators, 
pogromists) rather than victimized. Attention to the 
Famine also made more explicable why some Ukrainians
5 Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the 
Terror Famine (New York-London, 1986) and James Mace, "Famine 
and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," Problems of Communism (May- 
June, 1984): 37-57 and "The Man-Made Famine of 1933: What 
Happened and Why," in Israel W. Charny, ed., Toward the 
Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of he 
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide (Boulder, CO, 
1984), 67-83.
6 Of great importance was the official and still Soviet Holod 1932­
1933 na Ukraini: Ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv (Kyiv, 1990) 
and the Memorial "opposition" volume L. Kovalenko and V. Maniak,
Holod 33. Narodna knyha-memorial (Kyiv, 1991).
would have little loyalty to the Soviet Union in 1941 or 
might at first have viewed German rule as even a possible 
improvement. The debate on the Famine also influenced 
discussions of the Holocaust for these issues, as well as 
for the significance of the tragedy in explaining the 
brutalization and demoralization of Ukraine's population 
prior to the war.
By the 1980s the Famine had become a central focus 
of identity and rallying point for diaspora Ukrainians who 
aspired to establish an independent Ukrainian state. At 
the end of the decade, it played a similar role in Ukraine. 
As the degree of mendacity of the Soviet propagandists 
about numerous issues became known to wider circles of 
the population of Ukraine, the official negation of the 
Famine crumbled before a groundswell of eyewitness 
testimony. At the same time, the Soviet demonization of 
"Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" lost potency as voices 
were raised against the Russification of Ukraine and the 
sham nature of Soviet internationalism. In 1988-91 a 
general oppositional groundswell arose in Ukraine that 
combined anti-totalitarian, democratic, ecological, 
cultural, religious, and national issues. Its influence 
extended far beyond Rukh, the organized oppositional 
movement that had its main base in western Ukraine. 
Distrust of the authorities and the Moscow-center was 
intensified by the experience of the Chornobyl nuclear 
disaster of 1986. This recent catastrophe made plausible 
the allegations about the Famine and the arguments that 
the Soviet authorities cared little for the people and that 
the Moscow-center treated Ukraine with little regard. For 
the Ukrainian national movement, the Famine issue 
served as an effective vehicle for undermining the 
Communist authorities and the Soviet mythology in 
eastern Ukraine. The national interpretation of the 
Famine current in the Ukrainian diaspora spread in 
Ukraine as the country opened up to contacts with the 
West, and the projects of the 1980s in the West 
legitimized and served as models for activities in 
Ukraine.7 By 1991 even the authorities had come to 
acquiesce that a man-made Famine had occurred in 
Ukraine, though they were reluctant to deal with the issue 
of responsibility.
The August 1991 coup in Moscow and the shift of the 
authorities in Ukraine to a pro-independence stance 
radically changed the political climate in Ukraine. The 
ruling former Communist elite adopted many of the
7 Conquest's book was published in translation in fragments in the 
early 1990s and in full in 1993 in Kyiv as Zhnyva skorboty: Radians'ka 
kolektyvizatsiia i Holodomor.
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symbols of the Ukrainian national movement (the blue- 
and-yellow flag) and elements of the Ukrainian national 
historical vision, including the view of the Famine. 
Attention to the Famine in the Ukrainian media before 
the December 1,1991, referendum was one of the means 
the government used to build pro-independence 
sentiment. The banning of the Communist Party removed 
the organization that could be seen as bearing the 
responsibility for the Famine from Ukrainian public life. 
However one evaluates the adoption of Ukrainian 
national positions by the old elite and its cooptation of the 
agenda of the Ukrainian democratic national movement, 
the government in Kyiv did make the commemoration of 
the Famine one of its elements in establishing the identity 
of the Ukrainian state.
By the time that the Ukrainian government organized 
the commemoration of the Ukrainian Famine's sixtieth 
anniversary in mid-1993, the economic crisis in the new 
state and its failure to find adequate support in the West 
had made an increasingly weary population wary of 
Ukrainian independence and apathetic toward public 
issues. The re-emergence of the Communist Party and of 
pro-Russian and pro-Soviet sympathies in late 1993 and 
1994 also changed the political and cultural climate in 
Ukraine. Those forces that had found the 
commemoration of the Famine inconvenient and the 
interpretation of the event by the Ukrainian national 
movement unacceptable had more influence at a national 
level. Certainly, the Famine had receded as a public issue 
by 1995 as the Kuchma government returned to many of 
the propagandists of the old order for setting the cultural- 
political agenda. Despite the financial crisis in Ukrainian 
scholarship and publishing, scholarly and popular writing 
on the Famine, including indictments of the tragedy as a 
Soviet or even Russian genocide against the Ukrainian 
nation, continued.8 With the subsequent falling out of the 
Communists with the Kuchma regime and the oligarchs 
in the late 1990s, the Famine issue could be more readily 
embraced by the government, even if only as a way of 
dealing with the patriotic segment of the Ukrainian 
electorate. Hence the presidential ukaz on the Famine in 
2002 opened the way for greater attention to the Famine 
in 2003 as part of presidential political tactics.
Discussions of the Famine have centered on a number 
of controversies. Arguments that a Famine did not occur, 
that it was the result of drought or poor harvests, or that it 
was the result of anarchy during the collectivization drive
8 See the report on the Second Congress of Famine Researchers in 
December 1994 in News from Ukraine 1995. np. 1.
have generally been discredited.9 Although assertions 
that deaths from the Famine losses were limited have 
been abandoned, the number of millions of demographic 
losses is still debated. Intentionality and responsibility for 
the disaster remain disputed. While assertions that the 
Famine had no specific geographic limits have ceased, 
debates continue over whether it resulted from similar 
policies in all grain-growing regions in the Soviet Union. 
In particular, assertions that it occurred because of 
specific policies toward Ukraine, that anti-Ukrainian 
attitudes explain the failure to render assistance or that 
the Famine was planned are still hotly debated.
In the initial controversies in the West, the debates 
were largely between representatives of the Ukrainian 
diaspora and scholars who defended some of their 
viewpoints, and representatives of the Soviet government 
and scholars who opposed these views, some of whom 
held pro-Soviet, Ukrainophobe, or Russophilic views. 
The Famine also became a point of controversy in the 
debates of the Revisionists and their opponents. Of late, 
the increasing scholarly attention to the Famine and the 
ability to research specific topics with access to archival 
materials and demographic data in the former Soviet 
Union have reduced the ideological heat surrounding the 
topic. More and more of the scholarship is written in 
Ukraine and Russia. While the Famine is not a major 
public issue in Russia, Russian scholars have taken 
positions on the issue of whether the Famine had a 
specific Ukrainian character.10 In this way, the issue of 
the Famine has emerged as an incident of Russian- 
Ukrainian issues in the 1930s as well as in contemporary 
relations.
The demographic consequence of the Famine is an 
essential issue for Russian-Ukrainian relations. The 
twentieth century was a period in which the demographic 
balance of Ukrainians and Russians shifted drastically in 
favor of the latter. In 1926, there were 78,453,000 
Russians and 34,882,000 Ukrainians in the territories of 
the former Soviet Union (as well as the western 
Ukrainian territories later annexed), a ratio of 2.25 
Russians to one Ukrainian.11 By 1959, there were
9 One scholar making some of these arguments is Mark B. Tauger. 
See his Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 
1931-1933 (Pittsburgh, 2001) (The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and 
East European Studies, no. 1506).
10 V. P. Danilov, “Diskussiia v zapadnoi presse o golode 1932-33 
gg. i ‘demograficheskoi katastrofe' 30-40kh godov v SSSR,”
Voprosy istorii, 3 (1998):116-21.
11 Population statistics come from Ralph Clem, "Demographic
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114,114,000 Russians and 37,253,000 Ukrainians (a ratio 
of 3.06 to 1), and by 1989 there were 145,072,000 and 
44,136,000 (a ratio of 3.29 to 1). In other terms, while 
Ukrainians were outnumbered by Russians by 2.25 to 1 
in 1926, for every one addition to the number of 
Ukrainians over the next 63 years (a total of 9,254,000), 
there were an additional 7.2 Russians (66,619,000). The 
fighting of World War II on Ukrainian territories, 
resulting in large civilian casualties, partially explains 
this phenomenon. Events such as the Famine of 1947 
encompassed all of Ukraine and only parts of Russia. The 
emigration of many Ukrainians to Russia and the 
assimilation of the Ukrainian communities in Russia, 
particularly rapid since the abolition of Ukrainian cultural 
institutions in the 1930s and the arbitrary reclassification 
of Ukrainians as Russians in Kuban and other regions, 
also offer a partial explanation. In addition, numerous 
Ukrainians in Ukraine in those years designated 
themselves as Russians and the children of mixed 
marriages showed a preference for Russian nationality. 
Yet these factors are not sufficient to explain the relative 
demographic decline of Ukrainians, particularly in 
Ukraine itself. From 1926 to 1959, within the borders of 
the pre-1939 Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian population 
increased by only 1,879,000 (from 23,219,000 to 
25,098,000), while the Russian population increased by 
3,160,000 (from 2,676,000 to 5,836,000).12
The Famine of 1932-33 played a significant role in 
this relative decline of Ukrainians within the Soviet 
Union as a whole and in Soviet Ukraine in particular. The 
exact figures of the victims of the Famine are still being 
disputed, but by the mid-1990s the new sources and 
research in Ukraine showed how disproportionately 
Ukraine had suffered during the Famine. Robert 
Conquest had estimated 5 million losses in Ukraine and 2 
million in Russia, of whom, he estimated, probably 1 
million were Ukrainians because of the geography of the 
Famine in Russia. (He also estimated 1 million Kazakh 
losses in 1932, but did not see this tragedy as part of the 
policies that brought about the Famine). In his studies in
Change among Russians and Ukrainians in the Soviet Union: Social, 
Economic, and Political Implications," in Peter Potichnyj et. al. eds., 
Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter (Edmonton, 1992),
288.
12 Data is taken from Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and 
National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine (n.p., 1985), 176, 
with the population of Crimea, taken from the article in the 
Encyclopedia of Ukraine, subtracted from the southern region.
the mid-1990s, Stephen Wheatcroft raised his estimate of 
mortality from the Famine of 1932-33 upward from 3-4 
million to 4-5 million.13 While he did not give absolute 
figures for Ukraine, he estimated that the elevation of 
mortality in Ukraine in 1933 was 189.5 percent compared 
to 51.7 percent in Russia and 23.6 percent in Belarus, that 
the Ukrainian oblasts of Kyiv and Kharkiv had the 
highest rates anywhere in the USSR (respectively 268.4 
and 281.3 percent), and that it was high even in non­
grain-growing regions of Ukraine such as Chernihiv (111 
percent).14 Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi argued that Wheatcroft 
underestimated the number of deaths, and on the basis of 
the 1937 census argued there were 3 to 3.5 million deaths 
in Ukraine and 1 to 1.3 million unborn childen because of 
the Famine.15 A. Maksudov estimated 4.5 to 5 million 
demographic loss in Ukraine and a Soviet total of 7 
million, in which he included Kazakh losses, while Alec 
Nove accepted Conquest's figure as essentially correct if 
"somewhat too high for the Ukraine, but somewhat too 
low for Kazakhstan."16 In sum, the demographic losses 
variously estimated as 4 to 7 million were predominantly 
in Ukraine, which had less than a third of the population 
that Russia did. In addition, many of the areas of Russia 
affected by the Famine such as Kuban had high 
percentages of Ukrainian population. In essence, the 
Famine represented a demographic disaster for Ukraine 
and the Ukrainian population of the Soviet Union on a 
scale that it did not for Russia and the Russian 
population. Therefore, the Famine provides an important 
part of the explanation of the decline of Ukrainians in 
relation to Russians within the entire former Soviet 
Union.
Within Soviet Ukraine, the Famine reduced the 
Ukrainian and increased the Russian percentage of the 
population. The relatively high Ukrainian birthrate made 
for a rapidly growing Ukrainian population in the 
republic and an increase of their percentage throughout 
the 1920s and into the early 1930s. Yet from 1926 to
13 Stephen Wheatcroft, "More Light on the Scale of Repression and 
the Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1930s," in J. Arch Getty 
and Roberta Manning, eds. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives 
(Cambridge, 1993), 280.
14 Wheatcroft, 282.
15 Unpublished paper "Ukrainian Demographic Losses from the 
Famine in 1932-33 according to the General Census of the Ukrainian 
Population in 1937" (1994).
16 Alec Nove, "Victims of Stalinism: How Many?" in Getty and 
Manning, Stalinist Terror, 266,274.
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1937, Ukrainians decreased by 433,000 (1.9 percent), 
while Russians increased by 904,000 (39 percent).17 This 
represented a shift from 1 Russian for every 9.77 
Ukrainians to 1 Russian for every 6.89 Ukrainians. The 
rural-urban difference of national composition ensured 
that Ukrainians made up a higher percentage of victims 
of the Famine than was their percentage in the general 
population, while the more urbanized Russians in 
Ukraine were likely to have a smaller proportion of 
victims. (In 1926, 77 percent of Jews and 50 percent of 
Russians lived in the cities, but only 10 percent of 
Ukrainians.)18 Some of this change occurred because of 
migration into Ukraine after the Famine, including into 
rural areas.
By a rapid decimation of the fecund Ukrainian 
village, the Famine reduced its potential to serve as the 
source of urban migrants in the future. While it is 
difficult to differentiate the impact of the Famine from 
that of World War II on the Ukrainian village, the reasons 
for the massive Russian influx into Ukraine from 1926 to 
1959 can only be explained by the reduced population 
increase in the rural areas that were in pre-1939 Soviet 
Ukraine. Had it not been for the west Ukrainian village as 
a source of population growth and migrants, that influx 
might have been even greater. Nevertheless, by 1959 
there were only 4.30 Ukrainians in the area of pre-1939 
Ukraine for every Russian (3.79 if Crimea is included).19
The Famine also had significant impact on the nature 
of Ukrainian-Russian linguistic and cultural relations in 
Ukraine. The demographic change only partially explains 
this shift. The cessation of Ukrainianization and the 
attacks on Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism undermined 
the position of the Ukrainian language and the status of 
Ukrainians. They accompanied the collectivization and 
assault on the Ukrainian village, the traditional bearer of 
the Ukrainian language and culture. This would have 
favored the Russian language and the Russian-based 
Soviet proletarian culture in any case. Nevertheless, had 
the Famine not decimated the village, wiped out so many 
bearers of Ukrainian language and traditional culture, 
produced a generation of orphans who did not remember
17 “National Composition of Ukraine,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 3 
(Toronto, 1993), 542. The statistics for both Ukrainians and Russians in 
1926 are somewhat smaller than in the data taken from Krawchenko 
above, presumably because of a different interpretation of the borders of 
Ukraine.
18 Krawchenko, 50.
19 Krawchenko, 176, see note 2.
their elders, issued forth a stream of refugees to the 
industrial centers who wished to forget the horror they 
had endured in the villages and in many cases had no 
relatives left there, Ukrainian language and identity 
would have been more resilient and Russification would 
have proceeded more slowly.
Discussion of the Famine also involves the question 
of whether Ukraine and Ukrainians were targeted for 
persecution and discrimination by the Soviet system as 
well as the degree to which this system and its elite 
should be seen as Russian. Three issues remain at the 
core of the question of special treatment of Ukraine 
before and during the Famine.
The first is whether Ukraine was treated differently 
than other republics of the Soviet Union in the 
apportioning of grain requisitions. Some scholars argue 
that Ukraine was treated no differently than other grain­
growing regions of Russia. This contention must 
demonstrate that all grain-growing regions of Russia 
were affected to the degree of grain-growing regions in 
Ukraine. It also must explain why the non-grain-growing 
areas of Ukraine seem to have been affected more than 
the non-grain-growing regions of Russia were, and in 
some cases more than grain-growing regions were.
The second issue involves the question of whether the 
refusal to listen to the Kyiv leadership's pleas on the 
Famine and the willingness to permit massive losses of 
life constituted a Moscow-centric indifference or even an 
anti-Ukraine or an anti-Ukrainian bias. The question of 
the place and treatment of Ukraine and Russia within the 
Soviet Union during the Famine must be examined. 
Central to this discussion is the question of closing 
Ukraine's borders. This question initially evoked much 
controversy in the West, including the dismissal of 
survivor testimony, and has ultimately been proven by 
documentary evidence. This issue also involves the 
attitudes of the Soviet elite and, above all, of Stalin 
toward Ukraine and Ukrainians.
The third issue relates to whether or not the actions of 
the Kremlin or of the Soviet government can be seen as 
Russian, especially in light of Stalin's Georgian origins. 
This issue involves the complex gamut of questions of 
the degree to which the Soviet Union was a successor to 
the Russian Empire and maintained Russian imperialist 
or nationalist polices. The question has become even 
more complicated with the emergence of a Russian state 
that is viewed and often views itself as the successor state 
of the USSR. In popular perception in the former non­
Russian republics, the wedding of Russian identity and 
Russian language to Soviet identity and pro-Communist 
sentiment in the post-independence era has strengthened
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this view. In examining the situation in Ukraine in the 
1930s, “Russian” and “Ukrainian” relate to complex 
social (urban-rural), political (the national composition 
and linguistic characteristics of the CP) and cultural 
characteristics. In examining the Famine of 1932-33, 
topics such as the national composition of the twenty-five 
thousanders relate to the question of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, and in particular stereotypes.
Numerous questions remain unresolved in the study 
of the Famine of 1932-33. As they are studied, the 
research will permit more informed discussion of the 
relevance of the Famine for Russian-Ukrainian relations. 
Clearly the Famine had a great impact on the 
demographic relations of Ukrainians and Russians and on 
the linguistic and cultural situation in Ukraine. More 
complex is the significance of the Famine as an event in 
Russian-Ukrainian relations and the attitudes of various 
groups of the two peoples toward each other. Differing 
interpretations of the Famine and its differing function in 
popular consciousness also affect Russian-Ukrainian 
contemporary relations. Examination of many of these 
topics will assist in our conceptualization of Russian- 
Ukrainian relations in the Soviet period.
Frank E. Sysyn is Director of the Peter Jacyk Center for 
Ukrainian Historical Research, Edmonton. During 
Spring semester 2004 Sysyn was the Jacyk Visiting 
Professor of Ukrainian Studies at the Harriman Institute. 
He is the author of “Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Historian 
and National Awakener” (2001) and co-editor of 
“Culture, Nation and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian 
Encounter” (2003), among many recent publications.
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Roundtable on Russian Privatization
Edited by Padma Desai
O
n April 15, 2003, four experts analyzed issues of Russian privatization from different perspectives in a 
roundtable organized by the Center for Transition Economies, Columbia University. Marshall Goldman, 
Associate Director of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, and author of 
The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry, linked the emergence of Russia's oligarchs to the hasty and 
nontransparent privatization of Russia's productive assets. James Millar, Professor of Economics and International 
Affairs at the George Washington University, and author of several books and articles on Soviet economic history 
and the economics of transition, brought out features of the faulty asset distribution that reinforced the old structures 
of the Soviet economy, namely, the nomenklatura and the bureaucracy, and invigorated the growth of crime and 
corruption in its aftermath. Stephen Handelman, a writer for Time magazine on trans-border issues, associate fellow 
at the Harriman Institute, and author of Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya, traced the origins of the chaotic 
asset grabbing to the final days of the Soviet regime during which Party bosses exploited their connections to the 
hilt. Padma Desai, Gladys and Roland Harriman Professor of Comparative Economic Systems and Director, Center 
for Transition Economies, Columbia University, and author of the forthcoming Conversations on Russia, argued 
that the process of Russian privatization was politically motivated in its goals and economically inequitable in its 
outcomes. The interaction among the four experts and questions from the audience created an intellectually 
invigorating dialogue that is presented below. James Millar chaired the session.
Millar: Since I don't really have to introduce anyone, 
the order of presentations is Marshall Goldman first, 
then Padma Desai, then myself, then Stephen 
Handelman. Try to keep the presentation to fifteen 
minutes. To open, let me say that when I was an 
undergraduate many years ago at the University of 
Texas at Austin, Professor Montgomery, who taught, 
of all things, corporate finance at the university, was a 
well-known socialist, not a Communist, but an 
American-style socialist. During the pre-McCarthy 
days, the Texas legislature, as in several states, had 
hearings where they called up professors and asked 
them: “Are you members of the Communist Party? Do 
you believe in free speech?” Professor Montgomery 
was asked: “Do you believe in private property?” He 
said: “Of course, I do. Because I think it's a wonderful 
thing, and I think everyone should have some of it.” So 
on that positive note in favor of private property, let us 
begin with Marshall.
Goldman: Thanks, Jim. I appreciate Padma arranging 
this panel discussion. My book Piratization of Russia 
came out this weekend. It discusses the emergence of a 
small group of Russians in 1991 at the time of the
collapse of the Soviet Union who claimed ownership of 
some of the world's most valuable petroleum, natural 
gas and metal resources. It resulted in one of the 
greatest transfers of wealth in the world. In 1997, five 
of them were among the Forbes billionaires. Today 
they are 17. Some of them are self-styled oligarchs 
who have been accused of using guile, intimidation and 
occasionally violence to take control of these assets. I 
was curious about why it happened. In fact, how did it 
happen?
Who was responsible? Could it have been done 
differently? I recognize that any transition of this sort, 
after 70 years of Communism, was going to cause 
some inequality and controversy. That said, I wanted to 
analyze the process in depth. As Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
the Russian Prime Minister, put it: “We wanted things 
to turn out for the best; instead they turned out as they 
always do.” My incentive was to see whether the 
process could have been managed differently.
So I will describe the key features of the Russian 
privatization program in the few minutes at my 
disposal. I also want to bring out the new features in 
my book, some features that have not been dealt with 
by analysts like David Hoffman, who has an excellent
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book on Russian privatization. I will end by asking a 
question: Will Russia be able to escape the 
consequences of the past and move in a new direction? 
Will it do away with what has indeed limited its ability 
to develop for everyone's benefit? In brief, what were 
the main features of the privatization process and why 
did the leaders adopt a specific course?
Well, if you listen to Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly 
Chubais, Gaidar being the former Acting Prime 
Minister under Boris Yeltsin, and Chubais his cabinet 
minister in charge of privatization, they feared a return 
to Communism. When the USSR collapsed in 
December 1991, there was a good deal of uncertainty; 
there were terrible shortages. And, in an effort to 
prevent a return to the past, to give everyone a stake in 
the new situation, they decided to form people's 
capitalism. It was driven by the idea that people would 
then have a stake in the old enterprises that were newly 
being privatized. They feared that if they moved 
slowly, the factory directors would strip the assets for 
themselves, there would be rioting in the streets, and 
people would vote to go back to the old system. 
Moreover, the economy was in a desperate shape. 
Foreign exchange reserves were so depleted they were 
inadequate to provide for imports. I was there in 1992, 
and I can tell you the shelves were empty. That was 
really worrisome. In some places, there wasn't even 
enough bread. So they decided to move rapidly in 1992 
by using shock therapy. That meant that they tried to 
free up as much as possible of the economy and 
remove the controls that had been in place before.
Let me now focus on privatization. You must 
understand that Russian industries were gigantic, the 
result of the Soviet-era gigantomania. The bigger the 
scale, the better. It was as if they all came from Texas. 
There were of course advantages arising from 
economies of scale. Henry Ford gave us any color 
Model-T we wanted as long as it was black; that meant 
that it was mass produced at a cheap price. And the 
Soviets copied the idea hook, line and sinker, except 
that the planners were in charge. They also thought that 
if they overproduced, they would outperform the 
United States and the West because they would be able 
to mass produce items in large units at cheap prices. As 
a result, most factories were massive monopolies and 
were state owned and managed. The idea underlying 
privatization was to convert them into private 
monopolies. One of the major criticisms I have is that 
they did not concentrate on the possibility of 
facilitating startups and creating brand new businesses. 
That was a key flaw, particularly if you compare the 
situation to what happened in Poland.
The process created two types of oligarchs. You are 
not going to be able to see this chart, which is an old 
CIA diagram. It is in the book if you want to follow it 
carefully. The first category, which I call the
nomenklatura oligarchs, is represented by Vagit 
Alekperov, former acting head of the petroleum 
ministry. He carved out three oil entities and created 
Lukoil, which, for a time, was Russia's largest oil 
producer. Another example is Rem Vyakhirev, who 
was formerly the deputy minister of the natural gas 
industry under Chernomyrdin, when Chernomyrdin 
was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in 1992. 
Vyakhirev moved up, took charge of the gas ministry, 
Gazprom, when it was privatized, and made it his own.
The second set is more interesting. I call its 
members the non-traditional, non-nomenklatura 
oligarchs, and I'll say a little bit more about them. This 
will throw fresh light on the creation of Russia's 
oligarchs. They did not come from the group of the 
privileged and the well-to-do. They were not part of the 
establishment, because they were not ethnic Russians. 
They did not belong to minority groups, although 
Alekperov is Azerbaijani. They couldn't be part of the 
military, the foreign service, the KGB, or the higher 
levels of government. They did not belong to the 
nomenklatura, which was entitled to special privileges 
and the exclusive stores that served the ministry of the 
gas and energy industry and the like. Some of them had 
been arrested for economic crimes, because in the 
Soviet era, if a person wanted to get ahead outside the 
established system, he had to go somewhere else, and 
many got involved in the black market. Some of them 
actually ended up in jail. When Mikhail Gorbachev 
said in 1987 that it was all right to form cooperatives 
and undertake private trade, some operatives surfaced 
from the underground. Their illegal activity became 
legal, and they had the advantage of knowing how to 
operate in an environment of scarcity. So they began to 
barter, import, buy and sell. Remember that 70 years of 
Communism had deprived people of goods, and the 
smart and the savvy, who knew how to acquire scarce 
merchandise for sale, began to earn large sums of 
money. They began to set up banks, which took as little 
as 75,000 dollars in capital. They used these banks as 
ATM outlets, and used the cash for participating in the 
privatization process.
Note that Gaidar and Chubais also set up the 
voucher system. They believed that every Russian was 
entitled to peoples' capitalism. The first step in the 
process involved turning over most of the assets to 
managers and workers to co-opt them so they would 
not strip the enterprises' assets. The stock that was left 
over could be exchanged for the vouchers so that 
everyone would have a share in the act. Some people 
thought that the vouchers could be sold for cash. You 
know most Russians were clueless about what a 
voucher was after 70 years of hearing that capitalism 
was bad, and paper assets were worthless. As a result, 
some enterprising individuals bought up these vouchers
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that gave them control over many of these factories. 
That was basically the privatization process.
Along comes Putin in 2000 who tries to rein them 
in. Yeltsin let them do what they wanted. Putin took 
charge and said: “I'm not going to treat the oligarchs 
any differently from how we would a baker or a shoe 
repairman.” But of course, there is a difference 
between running a bakery and an 8 billion dollar 
company. Putin does not like criticism, and forced the 
dissenters out. He also removed the minister of the gas 
industry and the chairman of the Russian central bank, 
two men who were wholly corrupt. You know it is 
significant that Russia's second largest producer of 
natural gas is in Florida. He brought in new oligarchs 
to take over some companies. I argue in my book that 
Russian business today continues along similar lines as 
in the tsarist days. The pattern of excessive reliance on 
raw materials persists. Again, if you want to operate 
under Putin, and if you cannot find a partner who 
supports Putin, you're in trouble.
I also examine the question: Where did these 
people learn capitalist tricks after 70 years of 
Communism? It turns out I have an uncle who ran a 
catering business, and he was eager to get the contract 
for the Moscow Olympics. He met with the head of the 
Olympics and was told at a meeting that he'd have to 
give a 20 percent kickback to a French-American 
expatriate who would launder that money to the French 
Communist Party and others in Europe. So the Soviets 
were already capable of carrying out underhand 
activity.
Again, how does one assess the role of Western 
advisers? I think the record was tainted. They operated 
in an environment of insider deals, even of crime and 
corruption that reached right to the top in Yeltsin's 
entourage. Let me tell you a story. A man drives into 
the Kremlin, and parks his car, and the guard says: 
“You can't park there, it's beneath Yeltsin's office.” 
The guy responds: “It's okay, I've locked the car.” 
That kind of law-breaking attitude extended to central 
bank officials who stashed away billions of dollars. I 
was watching the process. It was because of me they 
decided to put the money away into deep cover to hide 
it from the Paris and London Clubs, which negotiate 
Russia's sovereign and commercial debts from time to 
time. Privatization also affected us in this country. We 
prohibited entry of several oligarchs. But the question 
is: Was there an alternative? Yes, Poland. It wasn't 
perfect but the Polish privatizers realized that if the 
assets were to be divided equally, no one would be in 
charge. Instead, they set up a system of 15 mutual 
funds. Each company that was set up for privatization 
had 33 percent of its assets under the control of one of 
these mutual funds whose directors could fire managers 
and prevent them from stripping company assets. So let 
me conclude. Will Russia ever be able to escape its
past? The difference between the situation now and 15 
years ago is mind-boggling. Most assets are privatized 
but there are important structural defects. The role of 
the state has been diminished but not entirely. Some 
firms such as Gazprom are still controlled by the state, 
and the state can dictate the policy Putin wants. Russia 
still needs a patron at the top. The state still owns large 
chunks of stock in other companies.
From a historical perspective, the chinovnik, the 
bureaucrat, still endures. He was there under the tsars 
and under the Soviet Union, and he prevails now. Let 
me tell you another story. A man goes into a restaurant 
in Moscow and settles down, and hears another patron 
shout: “Turn off the air conditioner.” A little later he 
shouts again: “Turn on the air conditioner.” After 
several rounds of “turn it on” and “turn it off,” the 
quiet man calls over the waiter and asks: “Why do you 
put up with this?” The waiter says: “It's okay, we don't 
have an air conditioner.” So the bureaucracy endures in 
the midst of meaningless but restrictive practices.
One of the main structural problems is that small 
businesses constitute only 15 percent of Russian GDP. 
It is around 50 percent in the U.S. And they are the 
source of innovation and growth. Of course, a few 
foreign companies have done well in Russia. Gillette 
has made money. Many large foreign firms are 
expanding. But small firms are at a disadvantage. The 
upstream large units have a patron at the top protecting 
them, an advantage that the small businesses miss.
What are the prospects of the oligarchs making it 
out on their own? It's possible. Some are threatening to 
challenge Putin in the December Duma election. Let 
me end by saying that Russia is still a country where 
the rule of in-laws is still more important than the rule 
of law.
God is interviewing George W. Bush, French 
President Jacques Chirac and Vladimir Putin. Bush 
comes forward and says: “Tell me God, will the U.S. 
ever be able to get out of Afghanistan and Iraq? Will 
people ever believe that I won the Florida elections?” 
God goes to the books and says: “Yes, President, but it 
will be 25 years and you won't be around to see it.” 
And then he goes to Chirac, and Chirac asks if the U.S. 
will ever come to like France, and if France will bloom 
again as an economic power. God says: “Yes, it will in 
50 years, but you won't see it.” Finally Putin asks: 
“Tell me, God, will Russia free itself from dependence 
on raw materials, will the oligarchs ever become law- 
abiding citizens, will income be distributed equitably?” 
God goes to the books and says: “Yes, Mr. Putin, but I 
won't be around to see it.”
Desai: Marshall is a tough act to follow. He gave a 
comprehensive picture of Russian privatization naming 
the actors who participated in the process, and
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described its consequences. I will concentrate on three 
aspects.
First, I will distinguish between the short and the 
long term, emphasizing that the short-term goal of the 
process had the tactical purpose of keeping the reform 
momentum alive, whereas the long-term goal was the 
creation of an efficient private sector in Russia.
The process had a huge ideological, political thrust 
in the short run. It was in fact a demolition project. 
Marshall correctly described the scale as the largest in 
history. Despite its scale and complexity, I believe that 
its objective of creating a market-based private sector 
will be realized before God disappears, although it is 
still a good distance away.
My second point is that Russian privatization was 
not imposed from outside. Of course, the IMF and the 
World Bank supported it but they were essentially 
outsiders. It was conceived, implemented, and 
administered by Russian reformers led by Anatoly 
Chubais, whom Victor Chernomyrdin, prime minister 
from 1993 to 1998, described as a neo-Bolshevik. 
Imagine one of the world's leading reformers being 
called a neo-Bolshevik! Chernomyrdin implied that the 
scale, the speed and the secrecy of the process were 
monumental and therefore had Bolshevik features. In 
any case, the process was not imposed from outside.
Third, the voucher-based privatization, which 
began in October 1992 and ended in 1995, was 
followed by the loans-for-shares program in which the 
leading oligarchs gave cash to the Russian treasury in 
return for ultimately owning stock in Russian 
companies that the government put up as collateral. 
The government could not repay the loans so the 
oligarchs got the stakes in the companies. That was the 
much-maligned loans-for-shares scheme. So the two 
phases of the program had distinct features. These 
programs were two ways of achieving privatization in 
Russia.
Clearly there were negative consequences. Small 
businesses did not develop. The prize assets were 
captured by the oligarchs. There was corruption. I must 
say I have an open mind about corruption. Corruption 
is like adultery. It exists everywhere but it is difficult to 
define and measure. Sometimes I feel that experts and 
analysts of Russia focus excessively on Russian 
corruption. There is corruption in India and China. 
Both however continue growing at high rates. There 
was corruption in the East Asian economies that 
reached close to 10 percent annually before they were 
hit by the financial crisis that began in mid-1997. It is 
possible that profit-seeking corruption, in contrast to 
rent-seeking corruption, has a benign impact in 
promoting growth. But, of course, corruption needs to 
be reined in by law enforcement. And Russia lags 
behind in that respect.
Again, has efficient management developed in 
Russia's privatized industry? The oil companies are 
ahead in that respect in terms of management, 
technological improvement and financial cost-cutting. 
But the manufacturing sector has a long way to go and 
their corporate governance record is patchy.
But to return to the short-term objective of 
privatization. In July 1992, Acting Prime Minister 
Gaidar announced that macroeconomic stabilization 
was failing. The Central Bank of Russia was ordered 
by the Communist-dominated Supreme Soviet, the 
parliament, to print cash to bail out enterprises that 
came under varying pressure of the price decontrol of 
January. As inflationary pressures mounted, the reform 
momentum slackened. According to Gaidar, a “new 
front” had to be opened to keep it going. Notice the 
military terminology. That initiative came in the shape 
of voucher privatization. It was originally designed to 
be launched in March of 1993 but was brought forward 
to October 1992; 150 million vouchers of 10,000 rubles 
each were distributed to everyone. The Russians 
thought they were on their way to becoming instant 
capitalists. The purpose, as I said, was to keep the 
reforms going. The following April there was a 
countrywide referendum that posed two questions to 
the participants: "Are you for the president? Are you 
for his reforms?" Russians responded with a thumping 
“da” to both questions.
Everybody felt good about the prospects of 
profiting from the voucher without realizing the 
problems. The Bolshevik biscuit factory located in 
Moscow had good credentials but voucher holders in 
faraway Vladivostok could not put their vouchers in 
the factory because there were no brokers and no 
electronic connection. By the time the profitable 
Gazprom was opened up for vouchers toward the end 
of the program in 1995, most holders had used up their 
vouchers. Around that time, General Alexander Lebed, 
later the governor of Krasnoyarsk Province, was to 
declare that the voucher could not buy an iron for the 
holder. It was indeed a boondoggle. But as I 
emphasized its purpose was political.
The loans-for-shares program which began in 1995 
provided cash to the treasury so that it could fulfill IMF 
targets of budget deficit. It also financed the reelection 
of Boris Yeltsin as president in June 1996. With that in 
mind, the positive and negative aspects need to be 
carefully considered. First, as Marshall argued, the 
oligarchs had acquired the cash earlier, starting from 
Gorbachev's days, by acquiring oil and metals at 
controlled prices at home, exporting them at world 
prices and pocketing the difference. Their connections 
helped. They acquired the assets because they had the 
cash. So the process of the oligarchs capturing the 
crown jewels of Russian industry began earlier. Next, 
if not Yeltsin as the president, then who else? The
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alternative was the Communist leader, Gennady 
Zyuganov. Did we really want him to be the next 
president of Russia? With what consequences? So this 
was a tough choice. Again, the distinction between 
rent-seeking and profit-making asset acquisition, which 
I mentioned earlier, is relevant. I agree that the loans- 
for-shares program was not open and transparent. So 
the oligarchs grabbed the assets more or less as rent 
seekers. But they could emerge as profit makers in the 
oil industry, which was under external pressures of cost 
cutting and efficient management. Finally, how does 
one define Putin's role in this emerging scenario? He 
has been emphasizing growth and poverty reduction. I 
believe that the loans-for-shares program created huge 
social tensions. Most Russians felt cheated out of the 
asset distribution and were left with their potato 
patches. But given Putin's emergence as a strong, 
stabilizing leader, and a pliant Duma, resources can be 
collected from the oil oligarchs via proper tax policies 
in the interest of poverty reduction and development of 
small businesses, which Marshall talked about. So I 
look at the loans-for-shares program as having pluses 
and minuses.
I want to conclude with a comment on my final 
point of the prospects for higher efficiency in Russia's 
privatized industry. The recent BP-TNK oil deal may 
start the process of the entry of foreign direct 
investment in the Russian energy sector. The oil 
companies are making progress in terms of cost­
cutting, technological innovation and efficient 
management. Of course, the rest of Russian 
manufacturing has a long way to go. The strong ruble 
damages their competitiveness. From that perspective, 
a rapid entry of foreign direct investment into Russian 
manufacturing is a critical requirement for it to become 
competitive and resilient. Especially in the small 
businesses sector which Marshall talked about. Here 
the extensive, strangulating presence of local 
bureaucrats is relevant. But retiring them from the 
scene is a long, complex process. So my feeling is that 
Russian privatization was marked by tough choices 
involving pluses and minuses. We also need to 
distinguish between its short-term political focus and 
long-run economic challenges.
Millar: Professors Desai and Goldman have by now 
stolen most of my thunder. So I'll try to emphasize 
areas of disagreement. In my opinion, the best 
arguments that have been made for Russian 
privatization are political and not economic. But I'm 
not a political scientist and some of my poli-sci friends 
do not really agree with that particular standpoint. 
However, as an economist, I feel that the argument for 
haste is not compelling, and I think the long-term 
consequences—I mean now—ten years later have been 
disastrous from a welfare standpoint. And I'm not
prepared to let the Western advisors, the IMF, the 
World Bank, the EBRD, and the Western professors 
who went in to advise the Russians off the hook, 
because I think their influence was more insidious than 
Padma indicates.
The Russians, the young reformers in particular, 
were long engaged in studying Western, market- 
oriented economics. And the recommendations for 
haste and for voucher privatization really appeared in 
Western literature. Professor Richard Ericson here, for 
example, wrote an article that was published after the 
failed coup of August 1991. His was an attempt to see 
the Soviet system as a model in itself. He argued that it 
would be necessary to take the system apart very 
rapidly. That was one argument. Ed Hewett, who was a 
well-known economist, also gave several lectures on 
the same point. But I think they were trying to 
understand the system and suggest remedies. On the 
other hand, many of the advisors that came to Russia, 
were driven by questionable motives—at least one of 
them was—and I think that the Western conception of 
the process of the transition did have more influence 
than Padma thinks. And she'll get a chance to respond.
I think the market ideology was paramount in the 
process. If you look at some of the early articles about 
voucher privatization, the economists were talking 
about it as a process where everyone starts with an 
equal share of funds. But then along the way, those 
with the ability and ambition to rise to the top acquire a 
major chunk of the wealth. I think the Western advisors 
saw clearly in advance how it was going to work out. 
The fact that Russian citizens had experience with only 
two kinds of financial assets in their life, cash and 
saving accounts, was overlooked. Of course, there were 
government bonds but they were never redeemed and 
were considered a tax. The voucher holders really did 
not know what was likely to happen with the assets that 
were put up for privatization. As inflation increased 
rapidly, the vouchers actually became more valuable 
than anything that was paid for because they were not 
affected by prices. So a few took advantage of the 
possibility of enrichment and became, if not the 
oligarchs, essentially property owners. But this was not 
because they were savvy players but it was just good 
karma.
Yet another motive for hasty privatization was 
greed. They said that in the old Soviet system influence 
was higher than Stalin, and it continued to be higher 
than economic rationality. In the privatization process, 
personal connections, personal contacts were more 
important than cash. The second element was the 
holder's savvy in selecting and acquiring an asset. 
Third, even the Russian reformers had a poor 
understanding of the structure of the Soviet economy. 
The system had two markets. The market for consumer 
goods was an imperfect market. However, the fact that
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there were queues for goods that were under-priced 
was a sign that there was a market. The same held for 
the labor market. These were markets where people 
had experience of being paid wages, occasionally 
looking for jobs, and spending cash. So when markets 
were liberated, these two sectors began operating like 
regular markets.
By contrast, the Bolsheviks had destroyed the 
financial markets, the markets for investment goods 
and productive assets. These markets, which are 
essential to a capitalist system, simply did not exist in 
any form. There were no bankers who had ever 
evaluated projects on the basis of profitability. Nor 
were there managers with their pulse on profit making. 
This meant that liberalization and privatization were 
destined to become irrational. There was no basis for 
pricing assets that were to be privatized overnight. On 
the other hand, prices could not emerge until assets 
were privately owned and managed. A rational price 
system cannot emerge without private ownership. It 
was really a chicken and egg problem. So these 
concerns needed to be addressed in devising 
privatization programs. But they were ignored.
One special concern related to the ruble overhang 
with the population. An ideal way of clearing the 
accumulated rubles from the Soviet days was to 
allocate and sell apartments to people who lived there 
and owned them de facto. That scheme would have 
fulfilled Professor Montgomery's idea of everyone 
having some private property. Then again the problem 
of pricing the assets could have been handled by 
inviting Western firms for the job. That was an 
effective answer to the fear that otherwise they would 
revert to central planning under Communism. There 
are plenty of firms in the West that make it their 
business to evaluate enterprises. I see no reason why 
they wouldn't have been able to call them in to 
evaluate the airline company, or the automobile 
company in Russia, and come up with reasonable 
estimates of their true worth. Such assessment is often 
invited by private firms, and the truth is that would 
have been a correct, a rational way to go about Russian 
asset valuation. But the notion of evaluating businesses 
leading to an overall industrial plan, which was used by 
Japan and South Korea, was roundly criticized by 
Russia's Western advisors. An industrial plan coupled 
with the advice of Western companies to evaluate 
businesses would have been a better way of putting a 
price on those products.
In other words, I think that there were a lot of 
different arguments. If you separate them out, I'd say 
that the economic arguments suggest going slowly, 
more gradually, and in a more rational way. The 
political arguments suggest doing the transition in a 
different way. The problem about rushing it and doing 
it in haste is that it has been a long time without
success in Russia. The decline in GDP, GDP per 
capita, is much steeper than anyone anticipated, and 
much longer than we have witnessed anywhere else in 
the world. I think the process could have been managed 
better. And I treat it as not something to condemn 
people with but I think it is something to think about if 
we are faced with a similar situation somewhere else at 
another time.
So let me conclude by just raising a couple of other 
questions. What should be the principle of 
privatization? What is the economic basis for 
privatization? Well, I think we have to divide it into 
two categories. The first is the incentive effect. It is 
clear that people take better care of their own property 
than they do of public or someone else's property. It is 
clear that when we own everything, nobody owns 
anything. Anyone who visited the Soviet Union saw 
the disrespect for public property. You see the same 
thing in the U.S. The incentive effect applies to private 
housing and to small businesses. But I do not think it 
applies to the ownership of corporate shares, to giving 
people shares in enterprises. There is no incentive 
effect there. But we are talking about some other 
benefit from corporate shares. If you quizzed a 
Russian 12 years ago about the difference between an 
auto factory, owned by the state, and GM with 200 
million shares outstanding, he wouldn't have a clue. 
The fact is corporate enterprises with share ownership 
permit the exploitation of scale economies. That is their 
advantage. There is another form, the worker-owned 
enterprises. They have not done well. When they run 
into trouble, they face problems of downsizing. 
Workers cannot be fired. When they are successful, 
they are converted into joint stock enterprises without 
bringing new workers in to share the profits. So 
worker-owned enterprises have not lasted long.
So what are the advantages of a genuine 
shareholder-owned enterprise? One advantage is 
suggested by Marshall. It allows for the birth, growth 
and death of companies. That is more difficult under a 
government bureaucracy, despite sunset provisions 
allowing for their closure. By contrast, competitive 
pressures in a market economy allow firms to grow or 
downsize or disappear altogether from the market 
place. Next, private share ownership allows members 
of society to match risk and income profiles. In other 
words, individuals can decide how much risk they want 
to undertake in order to profit from it. So it provides 
an option to the public for diversifying its financial 
asset holding. Third, corporate shareholding also 
creates opportunities for enterprises to raise funds. 
Fourth, we in the U.S. have increasingly used a 
competitive system to eliminate monopolies, especially 
natural monopolies, and to extend the idea of 
competition and free entry that Marshall Goldman 
talked about. That is also where innovation takes place.
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So to conclude, while private ownership and 
privatization generate these benefits, I do not see the 
need for rapid-fire privatization of large Russian 
enterprises. It was necessary to strengthen them and 
build them up. Look, if you want to sell your house, 
you in fact fix it to get a better market price. This has 
been done with successful privatization in which the 
better enterprises have been sold off first. By contrast, 
the peculiar privatization policy decisions in Russia 
resemble the New Economic Policy, the so-called NEP 
package under Lenin. Under NEP, small businesses 
and farms were retained under private ownership but 
the commanding heights of the economy, the large 
mining and manufacturing units, the railways were 
converted into public ownership. This policy change 
was calculated to give control of the economy to the 
Bolsheviks, enabling them to bring in socialism. 
Russian privatization, in my view, represents neo-NEP 
in which the state and the oligarchs hold the 
commanding heights, whereas small units have been 
allowed to coexist although they cannot expand. The 
process is incomplete but at this point I feel that a 
strange economy has been created in Russia, a neo- 
NEP arrangement in which the state and the few rich 
have gained control over the basic assets of the 
economy and everyone else gets the remnants.
Handelman: I'm tempted to say that the previous 
speakers were so brilliant that I really do not have 
anything much to add. I would summarize the various 
points of view about Russian privatization by saying 
that its various elements form a sort of a prism all the 
way from the most negative according to Jim to a more 
benign approach presented by Padma with Marshall 
somewhere in the middle. They all signal a sense of 
inevitability that it happened.
But is it really a success? If you went to Moscow 
today it presents a flourishing bastion of capitalism 
with the immense blossoming of stores, flashy cars 
including quite a few Mercedes Benz, and beautiful 
restaurants. You feel the Russians have made it and 
converted the country into a neo-capitalist or a neo- 
NEP system in ten years. Things seem to have worked 
out. Crime and corruption have faded. But if you went 
further beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg, you'd 
notice that little has changed. Here and there, the 
situation has even regressed in terms of some economic 
indicators. Maybe despite the problems, all we notice is 
success.
Having thought about the situation for quite a 
while, I am going to be a little provocative. It is 
possible that Russia could have avoided the loans-for- 
shares program with the oligarchs and still come out at 
much the same position. What has been left out here 
from the discussion is the link between privatization 
and the political and economic development. The
previous speakers have suggested that privatization 
was a political bargain. And that is very, very true. I 
would even go much further to say that, more than a 
bargain, it was a deal that was under way before the 
Soviet Union imploded. When I was doing research on 
the Russian mafia for my book, I ran into material in 
the archives related to the KGB. I saw memos and 
letters from KGB officers and sources in which they 
were basically planning the disposal of a lot of the 
assets. Some were to be put into new private banks. 
Others were destined to go abroad. Their basic 
assumption was: “The system as it operates now is 
probably not going to last. We do not know for how 
much longer, maybe five years, maybe ten years, but 
we want to position ourselves so we are ready to take 
advantage of whatever comes across, whatever happens 
over the next years.”
They probably did not expect things to fall apart so 
rapidly but they were certainly the best positioned and 
had the most capital to take advantage of the 
opportunities that came their way—all the bargain- 
basement companies and assets and resources of the 
old Soviet Union. And sure enough, several initial 
private companies and banks that were set up in the 
early 90s, had the KGB hand on it. In fact, many of the 
same people who at one point were talking against the 
evil capitalists ten years earlier were now in charge of 
making as much money as they could. Some of them 
were even hiring themselves as intelligence 
consultants. Why not? They were best poised to profit 
from the events around them. They had a sense of the 
direction of the economy, the changes that society was 
undergoing, and they wanted to be able to shape them.
The other major source of cash and capital in the 
early 90s, which enabled them to buy out as many 
resources and assets of the country as they could, was 
criminal capital. This originated in the black market, 
the gray market, whichever way you define it. That was 
basically the real economy of the country. And much 
of that money was essentially useless in the late 80s 
and early 90s, because the holders could not put it 
anywhere without running into major problems with 
the Party bosses and the security organs. When the 
system imploded, that money finally came into the 
open. It could be used, it could circulate. It could be 
invested in something different than jewelry, carpets or 
bribes, big and small, to other government officials, as 
was done, for instance, in Central Asia. So these huge 
streams of money converged in deals involving homes 
and apartments, one's own place to settle in.
At the same time, the new system was around the 
corner but not quite fully in. The reformers had a sense 
in the early 1990s that their project, the huge ambitious 
undertaking they were embarking on, creating 
capitalism after 70 years of Soviet-style socialism, 
might not work. And the biggest potential saboteurs
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were in the old Party. Indeed, the old nomenklatura that 
Marshall mentioned began to emerge and they had to 
be given a piece of the action if they were to be 
prevented from sabotaging the new arrangements. This 
wasn't just a theoretical issue. Several reformers I 
talked with in Moscow in the late 80s and the early 90s 
agreed that their teaming up with the old-timers was 
bad but they had no choice; they had to stack the odds 
with many of the criminal, anti-Communist 
organizations so that they would not create problems 
later on. But ultimately the chickens came home to 
roost. The problems of the late 90s arose from this deal 
with the devil.
Should they have done it? Did they have a choice? 
One of the direct results was that the reformers who 
made those deals with the devil became corrupt 
themselves. One by one they were accused in the press 
of bribes and high corruption. The shining example, in 
fact, someone still active on the Russian policy making 
scene, is Chubais who was one of the bright young 
reformers of the early 90s; he is now seen, right or 
wrong, as hopelessly corrupt. Remember, the 
experiment that Chubais and the rest began was 
intended to be political reforms but it became warped 
and corrupted in its economic consequences by this 
deal. But could they have made a different choice? And 
I would argue, yes, they could have. Because if we 
look at the net result, what we've got, despite the 
superficial glamour and prosperity in parts of Russia 
today, are huge pockets of resentment.
Now Padma raised the point that there is corruption 
everywhere, not just in Russia, but in most transition 
economies. Yes, people tell me that the corruption, the 
mafia, the rise of new organized crime, were 
temporary; that this happens all the time over a period 
of five, ten or fifteen years in transition societies; that 
today's robber-barons will become tomorrow's great 
industrialists; that they will win prizes for outstanding 
citizenship; that they will end up as chairmen of 
charities. It is true that some of them already are 
chairmen of charities. Many oligarchs, who rose to 
prominence in the early 90s, those who did not flee the 
country, are now seen as fine citizens. Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky is regarded as the most transparent 
billionaire anywhere in the world. Yes, it has worked 
for some of them. What has been left behind and not 
given sufficient prominence is the residual but 
significant feeling Russians have about this bargain. In 
public opinion polls from 1993, a majority of the 
people resents it. “If this is what democracy and 
capitalism amount to, we do not want them.” That is 
their verdict.
One recent bit of news about the infamous MMM 
venture, a pyramid scheme in the mid-1990s that 
attracted about 10 million people from Russia who lost 
about 100 million dollars. The perpetrators tried to get
away with it. They have finally been indicted in a 
Russian court. The final outcome is yet another story. 
But many people fell for the get-rich-quick ponzi 
scheme: “This is capitalism; everyone else is making 
money; let's get some ourselves.” There is a certain 
cynicism about it in the West: People occasionally get 
burnt in Wild West capitalism. It happens, but the 
overall result is a learning experience forever. The 
Russians are wary about the experiment, how it will 
finally end, and what it actually means to them. 
Marshall brings out a newsletter every month from the 
Davis Center. A recent issue had an interesting poll 
regarding corruption in which people were asked: “Can 
the government reduce corruption?” Thirty percent said 
“no” and only seven percent said “yes.” In other words 
massive skepticism still permeates the political and 
social scene.
In some ways, it has altered and distorted Russian 
politics today. Putin would not be president today if 
Russians did not resent the results of those early years 
of privatization and supposed capitalist successes. And 
remember, when he was campaigning, he promised that 
he would establish a dictatorship of laws. Nobody 
really knew what he meant then. We are starting to see 
a little bit of it now. He was going to tackle corruption, 
fight organized crime, make sure that wealth in Russia 
was redistributed throughout the country, something to 
counter the sense of aggrieved inequality that Russians 
felt from the early 90s. Has he done it? How successful 
has he been? This would take a whole afternoon of 
discussion in a separate conference. In many ways 
however, he has been successful. He has gotten rid of 
one group of oligarchs, he has slashed a lot of their 
clout in the economy. But he has, as everyone knows, 
his own oligarchs, although the power balance has 
turned around from what it was in Yeltsin's time when 
one could say the oligarchy ran Yeltsin; now it is Putin 
who runs much of the oligarchy. These people are still 
powerful in Russia, they still have significant political 
influence, but they've been tamed, so to speak, so that 
their influence is directed in the way the political 
system wants it to go.
The diagram that Marshall showed about the 
different oligarchs and what they control tells an 
interesting story. It's a shame that David Hoffman is 
not here because he thinks a new, kinder and gentler 
oligarchy has emerged in Russia. Seventeen Russians 
made the recent Forbes list of billionaires. Sure 
enough, a few in the list are young but most of them 
date back to the old days having connections with the 
old nomenklatura during the 1970s and 80s when they 
were picking up business opportunities. Besides, the 
system has not changed significantly from what it was 
in the early 90s. Therefore I go back to the question I 
raised at the start: Could privatization have been done 
differently? Should the privatization scheme, devoid
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of adequate laws or controls, have been undertaken at 
all? This question is important because we are still 
grappling with the problem of transforming economies 
that are politically stunted and largely state controlled. 
We face that problem in Iraq, how it can become a 
democratic, free enterprise economy. I suggest that 
Russia, even though the circumstances were different, 
offers a lesson for our policy makers. I firmly believe 
that we shouldn't go there again. And I'll stop here.
Millar: Thank you very much. Now we will give the 
speakers three minutes to respond.
Desai: I would like to respond first to Jim's point 
concerning external pressures. I believe that 
privatization was not imposed from outside although it 
was supported by outside technical and financial help. 
Privatization was essentially conceived and 
implemented by Chubais and his team. Next the entire 
reform process had several features of price decontrol, 
trade and capital account liberalization, and rapid-fire 
macroeconomic stabilization when inflation got out of 
hand in 1992. The IMF imposed budget deficit targets 
that could not be managed because of inadequate tax 
collection. Around 1996, foreigners were allowed to 
buy short-term Russian government T-bills, the GKOs. 
I have argued repeatedly that the financial opening up 
was a colossal mistake.
Not only were these measures for promoting hasty 
macroeconomic stabilization imposed from outside as 
IMF conditionality, they were actively promoted by the 
U.S. Treasury and facilitated by the broad policy­
making rapport that obtained between Boris Yeltsin 
and Bill Clinton. You should read Strobe Talbott's 
Russia Hand for the full story. I mean Clinton and 
Yeltsin were buddies, they bonded together, and at one 
point Clinton says, “Yeltsin drunk is to be preferred to 
any alternative sober.” So in effect, the transition 
became a joint demolition exercise. The two presidents 
worked together because they had common goals. 
Yeltsin was as bent on removing the Communist 
planned system as was Bill Clinton. That said, I would 
like to repeat that privatization as an important 
instrument of the reform strategy was planned and 
implemented by the Russian team. That's all.
Jim talked about the ruble overhang, the cash 
accumulated during the Soviet period because people 
had nowhere to spend their cash. They kept it at home 
under mattresses and in banks. In his view, the cash 
could have been liquidated by allowing the holders to 
buy apartments. Why wasn't that scheme adopted? 
Look, the Russian citizens owned the housing de facto, 
not de jure, having lived there for close to 40 or 50 
years. The alternative that Gaidar adopted was to raise 
prices; they freed most of them on January 2, 1992. As 
a result, a jar of sour cream, that cost 10 kopecks, cost
over a ruble after price liberalization. It wiped out 90 
kopecks from the buyer's pocket. But the overriding 
purpose was to obliterate the outdated regime of 
administered prices, to get the economy moving on a 
price-determined basis, and wipe out the long lines as 
well as the ruble overhang. On the other hand, if 
housing were privatized, the rest of the system would 
still have continued the way it was. What the shock 
therapists missed, and they were a bunch of 
technocrats, was denying selective relief to the poorest 
families via direct income subsidies or food stamps to 
counter the burden of higher prices.
Could any other feature of the transition have been 
managed slowly and systematically? Look, I have been 
known in the reform discussion as a gradualist. Could 
the post-1992 inflation haven been brought down 
systematically? The budget deficit criteria imposed by 
the IMF were unrealistic. The government was unable 
to raise taxes. Foreigners were allowed prematurely to 
step in buying the GKOs because they offered annual 
returns of 25 to 30 percent. Toward the end of 1997, 
inflation was brought down to an annual 5 percent level 
via stringent monetary policy. But, lo and behold, the 
Asian financial crisis hit Russia around that time and 
foreigners cashed their bills and walked out with the 
dollars.
Steve said that the privatizers made compromises 
with the devil. Perhaps. But the privatization process 
was legislated in the Duma; it was adopted by laws. 
When that did not work, presidential decrees pushed it 
forward. That was permitted by the Constitution of 
1993. Of course, Chubais made a pact with the 
Communists who dominated the Duma. The 
privatization option favored by factory insiders, 
workers and managers combined, gave them 51 percent 
of the shares. And that was a concession to the 
Communist nomenklatura, the managers, who did not 
want outsiders to grab factories. So there was give and 
take and compromises along the way.
Question from the audience: Can the panelists 
comment on the role of foreign investment in 
privatization?
Goldman: Remember the situation in the early 90s. 
The economy was collapsing. Managerial rules were 
opaque. Transparency was missing. Foreigners who 
stepped in were few and far. Boris Jordan, an 
American national of Russian parentage, opened the 
Moscow office of Credit Suisse First Boston. They 
bought up vouchers and got a share of foreign 
ownership. It was daring for foreign direct investors to 
step into Russia because the economy was collapsing. 
Its decline was 50 percent between 1990 and 1997. 
But there were exceptions. Mars and Gillette went in a 
big way. And I am talking about manufacturing, about
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foreigners buying or building a factory. Gillette 
continues to be profitable. Mars was successful until 
1998 at which point the factory was squeezed out by 
local bureaucrats.
Why was Kazakhstan attractive for foreign 
investors? Foreign investors are, of course, invading 
the Kazakh energy sector. The Russian oligarchs were 
not particularly eager to have foreign investors. BP is 
an exception. There is a possibility that Shell might 
buy a stake in an oil company. By and large, the 
oligarchs are not keen to have foreigners come in and 
mess up things. With regard to small businesses, stories 
abound about mafia, corruption, and collapsing units. It 
is important for a foreign investor to have a niche with 
a local guy. Just imagine you were Gillette, and you 
want to step in as an investor. How do you get into a 
country where the industry is state-controlled, and 
ministries are in charge of everything? The Soviet 
Union fell apart in 1991. There was a vacuum all 
around. How can a foreign investor create a 
distribution network? Perhaps he can do that as a 
vendor, but he can't do that as a manufacturer. And I 
saw how the Gillette people set up their network, and 
it's absolutely fascinating. They called it the Gillette 
miracle. They had to have a patron and be innovative 
through and through and that is not easy. Along came 
1998 and there was another collapse. Credit Suisse 
First Boston lost over a billion dollars. It was a costly 
lesson.
Desai: I think it was in July 2000 that former Treasury 
Secretary Paul O'Neill went to Moscow, and some of 
us were asked to give him suggestions for promoting 
American investment. He talked there about specific 
guarantees for foreign investors—tax guarantees, 
investment guarantees. Would they consider such 
proposals? The Russians threw cold water on the idea. 
I notice a strange coalition of bedfellows in Russia 
currently. The oligarchs do not want foreign direct 
investment except on their own terms and selectively. 
Their position is that they can give a boost to the 
economy on their own. They just need time. The 
Communists, the left, are weak now but they do not 
want foreign investment on the ideological ground that 
it is exploitative. The bureaucrats all over the country, 
and at the local level, oppose foreign investment flows. 
Controls help them. They can get bribes from this 
person and that person who wants to step into Russia. 
So this combination of oligarchs, bureaucrats, and the 
left is dead set against foreign investment flows which 
the Kremlin is not able to fight and tell them: "We need 
foreign direct investment in the manufacturing center 
without which Russia cannot grow at 7 to 10 percent 
annually."
In Russia, in several contexts, you hear ratios being 
cited. The maximum ratio of foreign investment stake
in Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas company, 
is 20 percent. That is good enough, the company says. 
In the old days, Indian planners used to debate about 49 
or 51 percent stake for foreign participation in Indian 
companies. Fifty-one percent for foreigners was a 
majority stake. In Russia, the preferred ratio is 20 or 25 
percent. They need a decisive, proactive push from 
policy makers in favor of foreign direct investment. 
That is what the Chinese leadership accomplished. 
That is missing in Russia.
Millar: I think I agree with Padma and Marshall. 
There is a general fear on the part of the public about 
foreign ownership of productive capacity and land. By 
the way, when the Japanese were buying up parts of the 
United States like Pebble Beach and the Rockefeller 
Center, even Americans got nervous. Some thought 
that they would detach these areas and send them back 
over to Japan! But the point is that there is still a 
concern, a fear about that in Russia. Remember in the 
early days, the situation was opaque, and foreigners 
were prepared to go as far as buying equity and short- 
and medium-term debt. This is how Russia got into so 
much trouble in 1998. What the Russians do not realize 
is that through joint ventures and production sharing, 
they can get technology, and new management. It is not 
just a question of foreign investment flows. Russia 
today exports more capital than is ever likely to come 
in via foreign investment flows.
Question from the audience: How can Russia develop 
its oil resources in a major way?
Goldman: American investors wanted guarantees of 
production sharing agreements, the so-called PSAs, for 
stepping into the Russian oil sector. It is an investment 
procedure that resembles their involvement in the 
Middle East. They develop the oil fields, they lift oil 
production, and they want to share the profits. But they 
want to recoup their profits via guaranteed output. 
They didn't want to be there as hired hands. The 
potential could be unlimited. But this arrangement 
implied that you took the equity away from local 
owners. And naturally the Duma resisted these 
proposals for several years. The Sakhalin I project is 
the only one which guarantees risk for foreign 
investors. But these oil fields are located offshore in 
the far North-East. It is freezing cold out there. They 
can operate only a few months in the year. There were 
prolonged discussions about having PSAs elsewhere. 
Two weeks ago they announced that PSAs are off the 
table. They might even revoke some past agreements. 
BP wanted to operate more fields via PSA-type 
arrangement but it may have to step back. That is a 
clever way of discouraging BP. The Russians say: "We 
can hire Halliburton, we do not want to make huge
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profits. Let us hire Western service companies. They 
can do the job and then go home."
We just had a conference this weekend where we 
discussed the question of exploring Russian oil 
resources. An interesting development is that several 
oil companies, among them Tyumen Oil, Yukos, and 
Lukoil, have brought in outside directors. A former 
senior officer of Chevron, who was also a director on 
the Chevron board, who was active in developing 
Kazakh oil fields, is now on the board of Lukoil. He is 
doing his level best to open it to the West. Yukos has 
two Americans on its board of directors, one of whom 
is Sarah Carey, a Washington lawyer. How effective 
will they be? They're pretty tough characters. Another 
speaker at the conference, Allan Bingham, a Harvard 
Business School graduate, went to work for Tyumen 
Oil. He basically handles the outside investment of the 
company. In other words, more Western investors and 
managers have stepped into oil companies. But I have 
doubts if more will follow suit, especially with Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the head of Yukos. He has been 
involved in a number of scams before he declared that 
he's been born again, or born for the first time, to see 
just how it works out. He has even set up an Open 
Society Fund in Russia. He is doing a variety of things. 
Some oligarchs are sending their children here. I had a 
few as my students at Wellesley. They launder their 
children, bring them home, nice and clean, and 
everything is fine.
A voice from the audience: What does a laundered kid 
look like?
Handelman: Just to take off on what Marshall was 
saying. This is a critical time for Russia, and their 
biggest macroeconomic challenge currently is 
integrating into the world economy. Russia is on its 
way to becoming a full-fledged member of G-8, or will 
be in France in May on the assumption that the meeting 
will happen. It is pushing for membership in the WTO. 
If a lot of building blocks come together then, yes, 
definitely, Russia can move effectively into the 21st 
century. However, one has to be a bit skeptical 
because, as in any country, there are protectionist 
sentiments, and they are particularly high in Russia. 
These are driven by the impact and resentment of the 
last ten years that we've been talking about this 
evening. The country has powerful oligarchs who are 
not in favor of seamless integration; there are others 
who are but they want to protect their industries. How 
effective Putin can be in managing this debate will be 
one of his key foreign challenges over the next year or 
two.
Question from the audience: Which way will the 
debate go?
Handelman: Well, predictions are terrible. It's quite 
possible that Putin can manage it if he comes through 
on his promise to establish a dictatorship of the law, 
creating a legal framework for moving Russia one step 
ahead. It's not a question of how much time it takes to 
prove if privatization works or doesn't work. It is 
obviously a long complicated process. The argument is 
that privatization isn't necessarily the same as 
providing Russians with the essential sense of control 
of their economy. If we look at our households on an 
individual basis, they manage to make enough money 
in order to survive. Likewise if Russians can be 
convinced of the burgeoning ownership of property, 
that they can hand it over to their children, and of the 
stable society that was implicitly promised to them in 
the 1991 revolution, then I think the process will take 
off. If they are not convinced of that—and there's 
every reason to believe that's likely because of the 
crime and the corruption—I think that the experiment 
will stop in its tracks, and we'll see some features of 
the old Russia that we saw before Communism and that 
we saw during the Communist period.
Desai: I think that Putin in his second term—and his 
chances of being reelected in April 2004 are substantial 
and that will perhaps be his second and last term—I 
think he could be a more audacious reformer in his 
second term. I'm hoping that he will be. After all, he is 
from St. Petersburg, and he may choose to follow his 
great predecessor, Peter the Great, who opened a 
window to the West. So the chances of his opening up 
Russia to the West are not bad at all. In an interview 
with me, Strobe Talbot used the term zapadnichestvo, 
which he translated as Russia's “Western vocation.” He 
said that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin used it but 
Putin does display his Western orientation. However, 
how assertive he can be vis-a-vis the oligarchs, the 
bureaucrats and part of the military is open to question. 
Perhaps, in his second term he can be more effective 
than he has been in the past three years.
Goldman: Can I dissent from that? In many ways, he's
an improvement over Yeltsin, in terms of stability 
certainly. We never knew where Yeltsin was 
physically, or mentally. We know Putin as a very 
strong leader. I get the feeling, however, that he
doesn't understand what a market is. Of course, he
espouses it, and he has good advisors who have 
advised him to lower and simplify taxes, and to reduce 
the amount of regulation. But if you cross him, you're
gone. I mentioned Boris Jordan before, an American of 
Russian heritage, who went back and launched the 
Moscow office of Credit Suisse First Boston. He 
thought that he had an understanding to run a media 
outlet which was a little more critical than Putin would 
have wanted, and basically Jordan disappeared. He was
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pushed out. You need this patron, and that's a little 
scary. What will happen in the December 
parliamentary election? The discussions I had in 
Moscow suggested that Putin might go after some of 
the oligarchs. So the oligarchs are doing all they can to 
move into some of the other parties including the 
Communist Party to make sure that a core in the Duma 
can prevent Putin from becoming too authoritarian.
Question from the audience: Can the panelists give us 
an idea of the role of the oligarchs in the future 
development of the oil industry?
Goldman: The Russian economy is being flooded by 
oil export earnings. The oligarchs realize that having 
grabbed almost all the oil wealth, the next step is to 
enhance their net worth by attracting Western 
investors, by becoming more transparent, by hiring 
Western accounting firms, and sending people out for 
training. A large number of Russians trained in the 
Harvard and Columbia business schools have gone 
back. Look, Simon Kukes, the head of Tyumen Oil, 
worked for Amoco for a long time, and returned to 
work for the oil company. Joseph Bacaleinik, who 
worked for the Vladimir tractor factory, came over to 
the U.S. on a partial scholarship to Harvard, and 
returned as number two man at Tyumen Oil. The 
company had a fight with BP, and BP threatened to sue 
them. But they worked out their differences, and BP is 
putting close to $7 billion in the unit. But there are 
questions for the next phase. Will the oligarchs 
improve management in, say, agriculture? In some of 
the provinces, the local oligarchs and government 
bureaucrats are in cahoots with one another. Gradually 
capital will flow in there too, raising opportunities for 
making money. It remains to be seen whether that will 
happen honestly or otherwise, and how long that will 
take place. But clearly improvements are on the way. 
Whether Putin will slap down people who criticize him 
is for me really the big issue.
Desai: I have another scenario in mind. The economy 
right now is oil driven. Suppose the price of oil drops 
to 15 dollars a barrel from its current level of 28-30 
dollars, then what? Will the oil and metals oligarchs 
then move into other activities such as processed food 
or sophisticated manufacturing? In that case, they will 
need foreign investment flows to bring in appropriate 
management practices and technology. So the potential 
for diversification rests on the price of oil.
Millar: Let me make a quick point. We keep talking 
about oil, and oil is a special case. The Western oil 
companies are used to taking very large risks because 
there is a huge reward. When you get into areas of 
manufacturing, you get value-added. But that's an area
in which it is particularly difficult to attract foreign and 
domestic investment. I think it's really up in the air 
whether or not diversification will happen.
Question from the audience: Can Russia develop a 
domestic Silicon Valley?
Handelman: Let me answer the Silicon Valley 
question. Russia has talented people with a huge 
potential resource of skills and human capital. Russia 
also has raw materials. So it should, by right, become a 
first world economy. Countries, among them Canada, 
are making a slow transition to a first world economy 
because they lack raw materials, although not 
excessively. That is not Russia's problem. Russia does 
not have that problem. As for Russia's Silicon Valley, it 
is largely in New York and California and Boston. I 
mean there are brilliant programmers who are here 
rather than there. The reasons are many, not just salary. 
They have comforts here they would miss in Russia.
Questions from the audience: Australia with 
enormous natural resources has prospered. Can Russia 
advance similarly? What are the prospects for the 
Russian telecommunications industry?
Goldman: Let me try to answer these questions. 
Australia has prospered because it has served as a 
provider of raw materials for China. Could Russia 
serve similarly for other countries? Of course, it has 
and it is. But Russians want to step into manufacturing. 
The trouble is that it has got so much in the way of raw 
materials. We did not really talk about that. Every time 
a massive influx of dollar earnings from petroleum 
pushes up the value of the ruble, imports become 
cheaper making it harder for local manufacturers to 
compete. So when the oil industry prospers, the more 
difficult it's going to be to hold the ruble down to give 
local manufacturers a chance.
What about high-tech and telecommunications? 
Well, there is a telecommunications industry in Russia. 
It is kind of made to order. The Soviet-era 
telecommunications industry was backward. There 
were inadequate land lines. Thus, mobile phones 
became an attractive alternative. However, Putin came 
along and yanked the franchise licenses away from 
some of the firms that had set up mobile phone 
networks and turned them over to some of his buddies 
in St. Petersburg. The challenge now for Russian 
manufacturers is that they must compete now with 
India and China. The Russians clearly have that talent 
but a lot of them have left. In terms of manufacturing, 
value-added is a difficult thing. It's not just that a 
relatively stable political climate is necessary. I'd also 
say that corruption is a deterrent. However, a long time 
horizon is a must. The payback from raw materials is
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pretty fast. By contrast, manufacturing ties down an 
investor for ten years or more. That means an 
environment with unstable and uncertain money­
making opportunities can be disruptive for the 
development of manufacturing. There are other 
opportunities in other places around the globe. So 
that's what I think holds Russia back. I just wrote a 
paper in a journal arguing that manufacturing in a 
balanced economy is a very long way off in Russia.
19
Ethno-nationalist Mythology
in the Soviet Party-State Apparatus
Nikolai Mitrokhin
I
t's no secret that people change more slowly than 
the conditions of the society in which they live. On 
the whole, people retain the same convictions that 
were considered progressive when they were young, 
and later in life seemed to be current, but already seem 
old-fashioned, if not obsolete, to the younger 
generations entering public life. After the collapse of 
the USSR it took almost ten years for the last 
remaining representatives of the old government 
establishment to forsake the upper echelons of power 
in the new state. Just five years ago, three out of the 
four highest government offices in Russia were held by 
people who once were former members and candidates 
for membership in the Politburo of the Central 
Committee. Even now former Soviet Communist Party 
and government officials retain their influence in 
parliament and a considerable number of regions in 
Russia. On the one hand, such a slow transfer of power 
facilitates the sort of evolutionary process, which 
according to Yegor Gaidar, is undoubtedly better than 
any sort of revolution. On the other hand, keeping in 
power people who adhere to the old stereotypes is not 
always good for the introduction of new models of 
government or the formation of new social values.
In this essay I will address the phenomenon of the 
existence of an internal ideology in the party and 
governmental elite of the USSR, an ideology that 
largely contradicts the officially declared slogans, and 
which is based on an entire complex of myths, 
including, among others, ethno-nationalist myths.
Non-Transparency as the Fundamental
Condition for Myth-Making
How can we explain the appearance of these 
myths? In the USSR the procedure for decision-making 
by the party-state apparatus was, on the one hand, 
bureaucratically formalized; on the other hand, this 
formal process was not followed (recall the 
phenomenon that came to be known as “telephone 
law”). As a result, lobby groups wielded enormous 
influence. The more non-transparent a certain
department appeared to the outside observer, the 
greater the significance enjoyed by its lobbyists.
Two factors worked in tandem (the non-transparent 
process of decision-making and the prohibition on 
public discussion), among people who were 
uninformed but interested, to give birth to a mythology 
that seemingly helped them understand the “essence” 
of what was taking place. And what was “taking place” 
in the party-state apparatus markedly differed from 
what was stated by official propaganda and what 
“ordinary people” knew.
The double standards in the work of the apparatus 
of the Central Committee and other central departments 
(with respect both to people “on the street” and one's 
colleagues), facilitated by the differing degrees in 
access to information, engendered a dual attitude 
regarding ideological questions. One the one hand, all 
officials of the central departments took part in the 
obligatory party meetings, paid membership dues and 
read the newspaper Pravda; on the other hand, they 
had their own individual sympathies in questions of 
politics and culture, which certainly did not always 
coincide with the directives voiced at the party 
meetings.
Personal preferences on social and political issues 
and values, in conjunction with the need to somehow 
explain the present-day conditions that did not in any 
way reflect official pronouncements (that is, in essence, 
informational hunger) lent authority to various myths 
in the party-state apparatus. For a number of reasons, 
both social and political, the ethno-nationalist myth 
about the perfidious Jew became one of the most 
popular. A significant number of officials in the party- 
state apparatus had recourse to this myth to explain the 
domestic political situation in the USSR. Moreover, the 
myth's simplicity and universality made it easy to 
apply to any and all situations, thus boosting the 
myth's usefulness and popularity. This explains why 
instead of following the slogans and actually 
conducting an internationalist (that is, non-ethnic) 
politics within the country, the party apparatus as a 
whole was indulgent in regard to the actions of the
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Russian nationalist movement; moreover, dozens of 
officials in the Central Committee and other central 
departments took an active part in this movement.
Reasons for Ethnic Xenophobia
in the Soviet Party-State Apparatus
Ethno-nationalism and, in particular, Russian 
nationalism in the USSR was a rather widespread 
phenomenon. But it acquired organized, though rather 
amorphous forms only in the 1960s—as the movement 
of Russian nationalists. The movement's principal 
founders were officials in the party-state apparatus, as 
well as members of the creative and humanities 
intelligentsia.
The transformation of the Russian Communist 
Party from a pre-revolutionary and revolutionary party, 
comprised of members of the intelligentsia who 
believed in the possibility of the social brotherhood of 
all peoples, independent of ethnic membership, into an 
ethno-nationalist party, as it became in the years 1949­
53, represents an interesting and complex process that 
has attracted the attention of many historians.1 In my
1 The most comprehensive monograph on this subject, which both 
takes into account previous work and incorporates an enormous 
amount of new information is G. Kostyrchenko's Tainaia politika 
Stalina. Vlast' i antisemitizm (M, 2001). See also: M. Agurskii, 
Ideologiia natsional-bol'shevizma (Paris, 1980); K. Azadovskii, and 
B. Egorov, “Kosmopolity,” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2 (1999); 
Ia. Aizenshtandt, O podgotovke Stalinym genotsida evreev 
(Jerusalem, 1994); A. V. Blium, Evreiskii vopros pod sovetskoi 
tsenzuroi (St. Petersburg, 1996); N. Bugai and D. Merkulov, Narody 
i vlast': “Sotsialisticheskii eksperiment” (20-e gody), (1994); N. 
Bugai and A. Gonov, Kavkaz: narody v eshelonakh (20-60-e 
gody)(M, 1998); N. Bugai, “Deportatsiia narodov - repressivnaia 
mera gosudarstvennoi politiki v sfere natsional'nykh otnoshenii. 20- 
40-e gody,” Krainosti istorii i krainosti istorikov (M, 1997), 157-73; 
V. Buldakov, “Revoliutsiia i chelovek,” Krainosti istorii, 21-40; A. 
Vishnevskii, Serp i rubl': Konservativnaia modernizatsiia v SSSR 
(M, 1998); E. Gromov, Stalin: vlast' i iskusstvo (M, 1998); L. 
Gurevich, Totalitarizm protiv intelligentsii (Alma-Ata, 1992); N. 
Kirsanov, “Natsional'nye formirovaniia Krasnoi Armii v VOV 1941­
1945 gg.,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, 4 (1995):116-25; G. 
Kostyrchenko, V plenu u krasnogo faraona. Politicheskie 
presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie (M, 
1994); T. Iu. Krasovitskaia, “O stalinskoi formulovke natsii v 
kontekste vremeni i mesta ee sushchestvovaniia,” Krainosti istorii, 
129-45; Landa R. Mirsaid, “Sultan-Galiev,” Voprosy istorii, 8 
(1999):53-70; L. Liuks, “Evreiskii vopros v politike Stalina,” 
Voprosy istorii, 7 (1999):41-59; M. Narinskii, “Kak eto bylo,” 
Drugaia voina (M, 1996), 32-60; Natsional'naia politika Rossiia: 
istoriia i sovremennost' (M, 1997); V. Nevezhin, Sindrom 
nastupatel'noi voiny. Sovetskaia propaganda v predverii 
“sviashchennykh boev,” 1939-1941 (M, 1997); R. Pikhoia, SSSR: 
istoriia vlasti. 1941-1991 (M, 1998); F. Silnitskii, Natsional'naia 
politika KPSS v period 1917-1922 (NY, 1981); F. Fiure, Proshloe 
odnoi illiuzii (M, 1998); S. Sakunov, NEP: evoliutsiia rezhima i 
rozhdenie natsional bol'shevizma, in Sovetskoe obshchestvo: 
vozniknovenie, razvitie, istoricheskii final, vol. 1 (M, 1997), 57-120; 
D. Brandenburg, National-Bolshevism. Stalinist Mass Culture and 
the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 2002); J. Brent, Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against 
the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953 (NY, 2003); S. Davies, Popular
opinion, the reasons for such a transformation are the 
following:
• the political and state structure of the 
USSR, in which the leading role was taken by 
a relatively small circle of officials, bound 
together by internal circumstances (discipline, 
secrecy) and external ones (informal and 
shadow relationships).2
• the social transformation of the 
1920s and 30s, during which large numbers of 
poorly educated children of peasants and 
workers joined the party, and later entered the 
party-state apparatus.3
• the personal ethno-nationalist views 
of the leader of the party and the state, Joseph 
Stalin.4
The Social Roots of Ethnic Myths
In the 1930s and 40s the “peasant children” who 
had relocated to the cities in an attempt to raise their 
social status and better their material circumstances 
actively participated in various “purges”; moreover, the 
people who were subjected to repression were largely 
those who stood out from the general masses by social 
indicators (origins, education, those who had relatives 
abroad), political affiliation (membership in pre­
revolutionary parties and oppositions, acquaintance 
with “enemies of the people”) or ethnic markers.
Since in the first post-revolutionary decade the 
party-state apparatus (like all other spheres that 
required intellectual achievement) was to a significant 
degree comprised of people of non-Slavic origins 
(above all, Jews and Caucasians), who replaced the 
former educated stratum that had been wiped out, it is 
not surprising that precisely they became the ones to be 
ousted in the late 1930s.5 * *In order to justify this 
practice a series of myths was elaborated (or adapted
Opinion in Stalin's Russia. Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934­
1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997); A. Weiner, Making Sense 
of War (Princeton, 2001).
2 A. Vaksberg, “Personal'nye dela chlenov KPSS kak istoricheskii 
istochnik,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, 5 (1992): 91-104; Iu. Zhukov, 
“Bor'ba za vlast' v rukovodstve SSSR v 1945-1952 gg.,” Voprosy 
istorii, 1 (1995): 23-39; V. Izmozik, “Politicheskii kontrol' v 
Sovetskoi Rossii (1918-1928 gg.),” Voprosy istorii, 7 (1997): 32-52; 
N. Kozlova, “Tseny iz zhizni “osvobozhdennogo rabotnika,” Sotsis,
2 (1998):108-19; M. Levin, “Biurokratiia i stalinizm,” Voprosy 
istorii, 3 (1995):16-28; Pavlova, “Mekhanizm politicheskoi vlasti v 
SSSR v 20-30-e gody,” Voprosy istorii, 11-12 (1998):49-66.
3 See the works cited above by V. Buldakov, A. Vishnevskii, Iu. 
Zhukov and S. Tsakunov.
4 See the works cited above by M. Agurskii, E. Gromov and G. 
Kostyrchenko.
5 The following departments by 1953 had become completely “free 
of Jews,” Germans, as well as other “suspect” nationalities: the party
and central Komsomol bureaucracy, the main political
administrations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aviation, central 
radio (after 1953 the only department that again was open to Jews).
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from the past) that enjoyed wide circulation among 
mid- and high-level officialdom, but which for all 
practical purposes did not seep down to “the people.” 
Moreover, these very same “people,” largely believing 
the propaganda, did not even suspect the party-state 
apparatus's “internal ideology.”
According to historian Gennady Kostyrchenko, 
who has analyzed the closed archival records for the 
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party 
(VKP[b]) and the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (KPSS) as well as the archives of the NKVD, 
the transition to a systematic policy of ethnic 
segregation, which manifested itself in the removal of 
people from important and prestigious posts in the 
party-state apparatus solely on account of their ethnic 
origins, was begun in 1937-38. In the preceding period 
the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party did 
betray its slogans in the pursuit of tactical aims, a 
practice that manifested itself in individual acts of 
ethnic discrimination that took place in the early 1920s. 
Systematic discrimination based on ethnicity also took 
place in many republics. However, at the general state 
level, as unspoken state policy, ethnic discrimination 
began to be put into practice only in 1937, when 
representatives of ethnic minorities, who “possessed a 
state outside the borders of the USSR,” were subjected 
to mass deportations from the border regions and 
arrests. In particular, 16 percent of Poles and 30 
percent of Latvians living in the country—the 
overwhelming majority of the adult male population— 
were subject to arrest and frequently execution.6 
Representatives of these ethnic groups were also 
removed from the party-state apparatus and the military 
complex; national schools for minorities were closed. 
In 1938 the Jewish population of the country, which 
comprised a significant portion of the party-state 
apparatus, was subjected to discrimination: Jews were 
no longer employable in the Central Committee of the 
All-Union Communist Party and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; on the contrary, measures were taken 
to remove them from these departments. The presence 
of Jews was sharply reduced in the NKVD, the Central 
Executive Committee of the USSR, and ministerial 
posts. In November 1938, Central Committee 
documents for the first time refer to Jews as “cadres 
that are soiling our institutions.”7 According to 
Kostyrchenko, this represents the beginning of the 
formulation on the part of the internal organs of the 
state of a mythology that attempted to explain ethnic 
discrimination as serving the interests of the state.
In my opinion, Kostyrchenko's explanation, which 
places full responsibility for the formulation of this 
myth on the Department of Leading Party Organs
6 G. Kostyrchenko, Tainaia politika Stalina, 132. 
7 Ibid., 203-8.
(ORPO), that is, on the Central Committee and the 
Directorate for Propaganda and Agitation, seems rather 
mechanistic.8 Especially since the author himself, on 
the whole, cites as the source of his information 
documents from the Central Committee of the All­
Union Communist Party, whereas the ethno-nationalist 
mythology was disseminated, by and large, through 
verbal channels. Therefore, we can establish only 
provisionally the time of the origins of the majority of 
the ethno-nationalist myths of the party-state apparatus; 
what is more important for us is that these myths 
remained in effect until the collapse of the USSR and 
served as the ideological foundation for the Russian 
nationalist movement.
A Generation of Officials
Who Grew Up in Xenophobia
Of particular interest for scholars who study the 
level of ethnic xenophobia in government organs is the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union—the center and headquarters of the 
party-state machine in which practically all the state's 
leaders and high-ranking officials worked at one time 
or another.
According to Yury Zhukov's research, during the 
postwar period the party's leaders were troubled by the 
nomenklatura's extremely low levels of education, a 
worry reflected in the resolution “On Measures for the 
Intensification of Party-Organizational Work,” dated 
July 8, 1946. Almost 70 percent of Communist Party 
members did not have even a high-school education; 
the situation among the nomenklatura was only slightly 
better.9 A practical solution to raising the qualifications 
of party and state officials became the education of 
hundreds of mid-level leaders (e.g., secretaries of 
oblast committees and city committees, heads of 
ministerial administrations) at retraining courses 
offered through the Central Committee and the Higher 
Party School. Many who received their first (and last) 
systematic education in these schools in 1947-52, went 
on to hold various and sometimes very high posts in 
the party-state apparatus in the 1950s-80s.10
Naturally, the goal of the training in these schools 
was not merely to raise the general level of education 
among the nomenklatura. The country was undertaking 
a serious change in domestic and foreign policy by 
increasing confrontation with the West and its search 
for internal enemies. The students of the Higher Party 
School and the retraining courses were informed of the 
newest secret instructions practically from the mouths
8 Ibid., 203-11.
9 Iu. Zhukov, “Bor'ba za vlast' v rukovodstve SSSR v 1945-1952 
gg.,” Voprosy istorii, 1 (1995):27.
10 See, for example, Vysshie organy vlasti i upravleniia i ikh 
rukovoditeli. 1923-1991 gg., edited by V. I. Ivkin (M, 1999).
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of those who were preparing them. All this, in my 
opinion, strongly influenced the students, and helped 
shape xenophobic stereotypes not only on the reflex 
level (I have heard the authority's opinion and have 
carried it out), but also on the level of worldview. An 
assortment of xenophobic stereotypes entered the 
system of values and acquired a mythologized 
structure.
That is one of the reasons, in my opinion, why 
ethnic xenophobia in the party-state apparatus in the 
1950s-80s remained in effect at the highest levels of 
power. After Beria's initiatives in 1953 (the resolution 
of the Doctors' Plot and the removal of barriers for 
members of the titular nations to hold appointments) 
and the indulgence shown the repressed nations in 
1956-62, no serious measures were taken to root out 
xenophobic attitudes.11 In the memoirs of eyewitnesses 
who worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party we find sufficient evidence of 
xenophobic tendencies in many of the country's 
leaders—from Khrushchev to Gorbachev12 and 
officials at various levels.
However, the majority of former staff members of 
the Central Committee, largely Slavic by ethnicity, in 
their memoirs, as a rule, mention xenophobia in 
passing, but rarely pause to reflect on this topic.13
11 On Beria's reforms that remained incomplete, see Iu. Zhukov, 
“Bor'ba za vlast' v partiino-gosudarstvennykh verkhakh SSSR 
vesnoi 1953 g.,” Voprosy istorii, 5-6 (1996):39-57; E. Zubkova, 
“Malenkov i Khrushchev: lichnyi factor v politike poslestalinskogo 
rukovodstva,” Otechestvennia istoriia, 4 (1995); A. Kokurin and A. 
Pozharov, “'Novyi kurs' L. P. Berii, Istoricheskii arkhiv, 4 
(1996):132-64; “Lavrentii Beriia: ‘Cherez 2-3 goda ia krepko 
ispravlius...' Pis'ma iz tiuremenogo bunkera,” Istochnik, 4 (1994):3- 
14; V. Naumov, “Byl li zagovor Berii? Novye dokumenty o 
sobytiiakh 1953 g.,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 5 (1998):17-39; M. 
Reiman, “N. S. Khrushchev i povorot 1953 g.,” Voprosy istorii, 12 
(1997):165-68.
12 According to the memoirs of V. Boldin, aide to Gorbachev,
Gorbachev is reported to have said that Andropov wasn't 
“completely gobbled up” by the domestic and foreign media, because 
he was “a half-breed, and they all stick together.” In another instance
Gorbachev gave Voldin instructions regarding an aide on
international affairs, A. Cherniaev: “Not everything is in order in his
family with entry No. 5 [i.e., the entry for nationality in the Soviet 
passport] in his family, so don't send him any top secret information, 
since it could “run off” quite far away.” See V. Boldin, Krushenie
p'edestala (M, 1995), 235, 376.
13 See, for example, A. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do
Gorbacheva (M, 1994); G. Arbatov, Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie 
(1953-85). Svidetel'stvo sovremennika (M, 1991); A. Grachev, 
Kremlevskaia khronika (M, 1994); M. Kodin, Tragediia Staroi 
ploshchadi (M, 1999); V. Kriuchkov, Lichnoe delo (M, 1997); V. 
Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva. Vzgliad iznutri (M, 1994); M. 
Nenashev, Zalozhnik vremeni (M, 1993); V. Pechenev, Vzlet i 
padenie Gorbacheva (M, 1996); V. Pribytkov, Apparat (St. 
Petersburg, 1995); G. Smirnov, Uroki minuvshego (M, 1997); V. 
Sukhanov, Sovetskoe pokolenie i Gennadii Ziuganov. Vremia 
reshitel'nykh (M, 1999); G. Shakhnazarov, Tsena
svobody.Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika 
(1993); A. Cherniaev, 1991 god: dnevnik pomoshchnika Prezidenta 
SSSR (M, 1997); Cherniaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym. Po
Myth-Making as a Genre
A powerful feature of myth-making in the milieu of
Soviet officials, in particular, among those who took 
part in the formation of the Russian nationalist 
movement, was its exclusively oral nature. In 
conjunction with the myth's transmission, a 
crystallization of the avant-texte (the myth's base plot) 
in a clear and simple form devoid of superfluous details 
was simultaneously taking place, as well as its 
adaptation to new realities. As a result, a very dynamic 
oikos-tekst (or “eco-text,” the variant of the legend 
active at a given time and place), as it is called in 
folklore studies, was achieved, by which it was 
possible to explain and systematize any phenomenon or 
event—from international negotiations to everyday 
conflicts. An analogous phenomenon is the Soviet 
political anecdote, also a product of verbal culture. 
Many of these anecdotes endured for decades, since the 
narrator need only change the characters to the present 
day.14 Not for nothing the collection of anti-Semitic 
anecdotes frequently served as a password for members 
of the Russian nationalist movement in unfamiliar 
surroundings. The listener's reaction to these anecdotes 
served to chart his position on the spectrum of ethno- 
nationalistic ideology in general, and if the reaction 
was negative, the incident could always be passed off 
as an unsuccessful joke. However, the anti-Semitic or 
anti-Caucasian anecdote served merely to illustrate an 
entire set of fundamental myths, shared by members of 
the Russian nationalist movement (about Jews, about 
the Russian state, about Stalin). These myths were 
supported by a corpus of exemplary legends. 
Unfortunately, we cannot point to any one single text 
that was generally recognized by the Russian 
nationalists in the 1950s and 60s to be the fullest 
representation of the ethno-nationalist myths. However, 
this lack is partially filled by two literary works written 
by Russian nationalists and published by the state's 
presses: Valentin Ivanov's Golden Metal and Ivan 
Shevtsov's Louse.15 Both authors later took an active
dnevnikovym zapisiam (M, 1993); A. Iakovlev, Gor'kaia chasha 
(Yaroslavl, 1994). Even the enterprising L. Onikov, a liberal official
in the Central Committee, when describing in his book the various
faults of this institution, uses the term “nationalism” only in the case
of anti-Russian sentiments voiced in the Central Asian republics 
(KPSS: anatmoiia raspada. Vzgliad iznutri apparata TsK [M, 1996]). 
This is all the more surprising, considering his interest in the problem 
of anti-Semitism. It is interesting to note that the memoirs written by 
former officials of the Central Committee were largely penned by the 
fairly liberal members of the International Department and aides to 
the general secretaries for the years 1970-1980 (these categories
overlap to a significant degree). The memoirs of officials in the 
Central Committee during the period of the 1950s and 60s represent 
a much more modest contribution.
14 See, for example, Istoriia SSSR v anekdotakh. 1917-1992, edited 
by M. Dubovskii (Smolensk, 1991).
15 V. Ivanov, Zheltyi metall (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1956) and 
I. Shevtsov, Tlia (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1963). In 1957
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part in the Russian nationalist movement and were 
considered members of the “Russian Party” that 
commenced its operations in the late 1960s.
In addition, I have analyzed the annotated catalog 
of cases from the USSR Procurator's Office on Anti­
Soviet Agitation and Propaganda,”* 16 both as a source to 
define the ethno-nationalistic mythology and to aid in 
my evaluation of the dissemination of the primary 
myths and the different social groups involved. This 
catalog contains brief entries on approximately 60 
percent of all those imprisoned for anti-Soviet agitation 
and propaganda for the period from March 5, 1953 
through 1991.17 Although I have used data for a 
somewhat shorter time period, from March 5, 1953 
through January 1, 1987, the number of cases thus 
excluded is quite small when compared to the total 
number.
The Myth about Jews and Caucasians
The fundamental myth of the Russian nationalists 
in the party-state apparatus, which was handed down to 
the movement of the Russian nationalists, goes like 
this: all Jews (“Zionist” or “Troskyite” is often used 
instead of the word “Jew”) are inclined to conspiracies, 
possess certain general characteristics (as a rule, 
negative ones), are connected by mutual responsibility 
and help their own kind. In addition, they produce 
nothing useful, but “they eat Russian bread.” They 
don't like Russians or the state in which they live, and 
are inclined to betrayal, often with the assistance or at 
the request of their relatives in the West. Given the 
chance, they are prepared to flee abroad with all the 
wealth that they have accumulated in Russia.
A large measure of this myth undoubtedly bears a 
pre-revolutionary stamp (for example, the idea that 
Jews are potential betrayers compelled the tsarist 
government in World War I to resettle several 
hundreds of thousands of people from the Pale of 
Settlement to central Russia); the myth, however, 
underwent a significant transformation during its 
resurgence among the political elite in the 1930s and 
40s and its utilization in propaganda in 1948-53. The 
Soviet fundamental myth about Jews differs in 
important respects from its pre-revolutionary variant, 
most notably, in its racist features. If before the
Glavlit was compelled to remove Ivanov's “book from circulation,
since it contained hooligan attacks on Georgians and other Soviet
peoples” (see “Zapiska otdela propagandy i agitatsii TsK KPSS po
soiuznym respublikam i otdela kul'tury TsK KPSS,” Ideologicheskie 
komissii TsK KPSS, 1958-1964: Dokumenty (M, 1998), 76.
16 “58-10. Nadzornye proizvodstva Prokuratury SSSR po delam ob 
antisovetskoi agitatsii i propagande: annotirovannyi katalog, mart 
1953-1991,” edited by V. A. Kozlova and S. V. Mironenko (M, 
1999).
17 Ibid., 6.
Revolution Jewishness was defined, above all, as a 
religious affiliation, in the atheistic USSR the 
definition of the Jew and Jewishness came to be 
defined by the racist “principle of blood.” For those 
who wished to appear to be Russian in the eyes of 
those around them (particularly those who were ill 
disposed towards them) one not only had to have the 
“correct” entry in one's passport, but one also must 
possess the right facial composition, name and 
patronymic, accent and everyday customs. An even 
more significant transformation took place in regard to 
the Caucasians, in particular, those members of the 
region's Christian peoples: Georgians, Armenians, and 
Ossetians. Among Russian nationalists the pre­
revolutionary positive regard for their “Orthodox 
brethren” disappears completely, and is replaced by a 
firm dislike for all “dark” people, above all, the 
Orthodox Georgians. Virtually all the negative qualities 
ascribed to Jews are heaped on them, with the 
exception of miserliness and potential for betrayal to a 
foreign enemy.
The “Caucasian” theme for our purposes is 
optional, since the Russian nationalist movement from 
the second half of the 1950s until the mid-1970s did 
not see serious enemies in the people of the Caucasus. 
It does, however, require some commentary. The myth 
about the Caucasians in the 1950s through the 1980s 
underwent a certain evolution. In the first half of the 
1950s, when the Politburo membership included 
several people of Caucasian origin (Stalin, Beria, 
Mikoyan), Caucasians were accused (as a rule, along 
with Jews) of seizing political power in the country and 
exploiting the Russian people. The well-known Soviet 
writer Konstantin Simonov recalls in his memoirs that 
already in 1933 a leaflet, entitled “And the Slavs Began 
to Argue Who Should Rule Russia,” was circulated 
among the students of the Factory-Manufacturing 
School. The leaflet portrayed Trotsky, Kamenev, and 
Zinoviev on one side of a river, and Stalin, Enukidze 
and Mikoyan (or Ordzhonikidze) on the other.18 Later, 
for example in 1947-52, in Leningrad one member of 
the Communist Party “engaged in sending anonymous 
letters (29 letters came to light), in which he wrote that 
the Russian people in the USSR are in a state of 
oppression, and that ‘in many spheres Jews hold sway,' 
‘the union of the butchers of the Caucasus and the Jews 
has become the enslaver of the Russians,' ‘the peasant 
is being fleeced by the butchers' and so forth. The 
anonymous letters also contained calls to disseminate 
these appeals.”19 In Ivanov's novel this idea is set forth 
in the guise of the history of the rogue “Prince
18 K. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia (M, 1988), 44­
45.
19 A. Vakser, 97.
24
Tsinandalsky” who has made the Russian Dunya20 fall 
in love with him. Tsinandalsky scandalously extorts 
money from Dunya, who yearns for the “beautiful 
life.”21
The table below shows the number of ethnic 
Russians, as well as those who spoke in the name of 
the Russian people (Belorussians, Ukrainians, Komi), 
arrested throughout the entire territory of the former 
Soviet Union for ethno-nationalist acts (declarations, 
speeches, letters, leaflets, etc.).
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In comparison with the total number of cases 
inventoried in the catalog (approximately 3,500) the 
number of cases related to Russian nationalists is quite 
small. True, not all of the cases in the catalog are 
described with the same degree of detail and it is 
possible that a significant number of the cases 
instituted for “slanderous pronouncements aimed at 
one of the state's leaders” or “anti-Soviet letters” also 
falls within the parameters of our study, just as they 
may have no bearing whatsoever. However, for the 
calculation of quantitative indicators they are 
sufficient—almost 100 cases comprise an adequate 
selection. From the numbers given in Table 1 it is clear
20 The name Dunya is synonymous with Russian provincialism.
21 See the memoirs of A. Mikoian, who becomes offended by
Khrushchev when the latter suspects him of having ties with Beria in
1953, only because they are both Caucasians. (Mikoian, Tak bylo. 
Razmyshleniia o minuvshem [M, 1999], 588.)
that even out of the total number of cases in the entire 
study, anti-Georgian xenophobic invectives account for 
18 percent of the total of xenophobic utterances, 
following purely anti-Semitic invectives, which 
account for 35 percent of the total number of cases.22 
However, if we take mid-1954 as our time period 
(Stalin and Beria are both gone), the number of anti­
Semitic and anti-Georgian cases is identical—12; 
moreover, during the same period there are only 11 
cases for acts directed at all other nations combined. 
From mid-1954, after the disappearance from power of 
all the Georgian leaders, the Russian nationalists were 
preoccupied, by and large, with the Jews.
In the 1970s the Russian nationalists once again 
claimed that Russians were being exploited by 
Caucasians (above all, Georgians). Insofar as large 
northern wages were spent at collective farm markets 
for much-needed vitamins for the residents of the 
Russian North and Siberia, brought from Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, while the “shabashniki” (seasonal workers) 
from Armenia and Chechnya were engaged in seasonal 
construction work in the depopulated towns outside the 
black earth belt, earning by Soviet standards enormous 
sums of money, the village prose writers, giving voice 
to the prevailing stereotypes, accused the Caucasians of 
speculation (see Viktor Astafyev, Fishing for Minnows 
and Vasily Belov, The Eves).
The primary myth for the Russian nationalists, 
however, remained that of anti-Semitism. The books by 
Valentin Ivanov and Ivan Shevtsov, largely written in 
the early 1950s, clearly illustrate this, even though they 
were published after Stalin's death and the 
rehabilitation of those involved in the Doctors' Plot. In 
both books, the main hero, a young Russian who has 
served at the front, is engaged in a struggle with a 
group of Jews who are older, experienced, and 
naturally, who did not fight in the war. Both of these 
novels include one peripheral, positive character who is 
Jewish—clearly for the benefit of the censorship. In a 
recent interview Shevtsov admitted as much: “I used 
him like a lighting rod,” he stated, referring to the 
young sculptor Yakov Kantsel in his novel The Louse; 
Kantsel is run over by a car for refusing to collaborate 
with the cosmopolites.23 *
The main subject of Ivanov's novel Golden Metal 
is the creation by the Jews of a system to steal gold 
from the Siberian mines and sell it abroad. The roles of
22 It's possible that such a large percentage of cases (approximately
one-third) instituted in Georgia was brought about by the specific 
nature of the local MGB-KGB. It is hardly likely that local
inhabitants in other Caucasian republics, who were Russian by 
nationality, were so sparing of expressing negative attitudes about 
representatives of the native peoples of these states, but evidently the 
authorities were more tolerant.
23 Iu. Vasil'ev, “Tlia masonskaia,” Moskovskie novosti, 19-25
December 2000.
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negative heroes are filled out with Georgians, Old 
Believers, Tatars, Kazhdars (Iranians), a Little Russian 
kulak and Russian alcoholics.
Shevtsov, an army journalist, was on friendly terms 
with prominent Soviet sculptors and artists—leaders of 
the fine arts in the late Stalin period (for example, A. 
Gerasimov, E. Vuchetich, N. Tomsky, and P. Korin). 
In his novel The Louse he expressed their point of view 
on the conditions obtaining in Soviet art. A handful of 
young Russian “realist” artists finds itself in opposition 
with the more experienced Jewish art critics whose 
sympathies lay with abstract art. The chief authority for 
the Jews—the artist Barselonsky (a parody of Ilya 
Ehrenburg)—has ties with foreign countries and certain 
officials who protect him. Together they hound the 
Russian “realists.”
The Legend about the “Kremlin Wives”
In addition to the primary myth about the Jews, 
several additional legends were elaborated in the 
1930s-50s, which while less significant, nonetheless 
saw fairly frequent use.
The essence of the legend about the “Kremlin 
wives” maintained that thanks to Stalin, Jews no longer 
held positions of power in the bureaucracy, especially 
at the highest levels (some considered certain high- 
placed officials to be “hidden Jews”—but that 
represented an “extreme” view); nevertheless the 
“Zionists” were “carrying on their politics” as before 
through the wives of members of the Politburo (above 
all, Leonid Brezhnev). Insofar as Kremlin etiquette 
restricted as much as possible information about the 
personal lives of the leaders, “specialists” formed their 
conjectures on the ethnic origins of the leadership's 
spouses based on their names (for example, the name 
of Brezhnev's wife Viktoria Petrovna was considered 
to be “Jewish”) or their personal appearance.
It was precisely the legend about the “Kremlin 
wives” that explained for the ethno-nationalists the 
incomprehensible indifference of many highly placed 
officials to the ideas of Russian nationalism. For this 
very reason, the “chauvinist” Vyacheslav Molotov 
(according to A. Mikoyan),24 though married to a well- 
known government figure of Jewish origins, Polina 
Zhemchuzhina, in the 1970s was a more respected 
figure in the ethno-nationalist pantheon than Brezhnev 
or Suslov, since the Jewish origins of their wives was 
discussed, but no authoritative sources of information 
were forthcoming.
The first mention of the existence of this legend 
dates from March 1953. According to the annotated 
catalog cited above, “58-10. USSR Procurator's Office 
on Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda,” on March 
7, 1953 a certain N. I. Slezkin (born 1909, Russian
24 Mikoian, 581.
member of the KPSS, resident of the city of Smolensk, 
and, of no small importance, the director of the 
regional spirits trust) recorded in his diary:
All Jews should be deported from the USSR, I didn't 
like Molotov because Zhemchuzhnaya [sic!] was his 
wife, she tried to make an attempt on the life of 
Comrade Stalin, which has been exposed. The politics 
of the Jews can be summed up as trying to worm 
themselves into the government, even by such means as 
marriage to one of the members of the government, and 
then carry out their acts.”25
Thus, already at the time the Stalin era was drawing to 
a close, the legend about the “Kremlin wives” was 
sufficiently widely disseminated to capture the 
imagination of a member of the provincial elite.
In Shevtsov's book the legend about the “Kremlin 
wives” (without using that term) comes into play three 
times. Positive heroes are offered the opportunity to 
marry negative characters—Jewish women. And in the 
only instance when this succeeds, the positive but 
weak-willed hero “ruins himself” and begins to “pursue 
the policy” of his wife and her relatives. If the author's 
statement is correct and the novel was written around 
1952, and if the main plot lines indeed did not undergo 
major changes in later editions, then the myth about the 
“Kremlin wives” possibly took shape in the 1940s. In 
any case, there is no doubt that Shevtsov was familiar 
with it. In his memoirs he recalls a meeting with the 
writer S. N. Sergeev-Tsensky in 1958 at which this 
subject was discussed. Shevtsov made the following 
remarks at this meeting: “The institution of wives is a 
Zionist strategy. This situation can be found not only in 
art and literature, but also in the highest spheres of 
power.”26 The earliest recorded use of the term 
“Kremlin wives” that I have been able to trace is to be 
found in V. Ganichev's memoirs in connection with his 
work at the journal Molodaya Gvardiya in the mid- 
1960s. He writes that the editor-in-chief of this journal, 
A. Nikonov, gave him lists of the “Kremlin wives” so 
that he might familiarize himself with them. This 
means that the legend had already developed quite 
substantially and that it had shifted from the verbal 
level to the written.27 *One of the more active Russian 
nationalists, S. Semanov, compiled a list of the 
“Kremlin wives” in the second half of the 1960s. A 
copy of his list (undated) with the names of the 
“Kremlin wives” and deciphered pseudonyms of the 
leaders of the Russian Communist Party and the All­
Union Communist Party during the 1920s and 30s can 
be found in the author's archive.
25 “58-10. Nadzornye proizvodstva Prokuratury SSSR po delam ob
antisovetskoi agitatsii i propagande,” 92.
26 Shevtsov, 455.
27 See “Velichie i padenie ‘Molodoi Gvardii,'” Nash Sovremennik, 9
(1997):200.
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The idea of the perfidious influence of these Jewish 
wives (real or mythical)—and later the Jewish sons- 
and daughters-in-law—on the social and political 
views of those people who were ethnically pure in the 
eyes of the Russian nationalists was utilized rather 
widely later as well.
The reverse of this legend was represented by 
Freudian motifs in the work of the Russian nationalists 
themselves. Virtually all of the works written in the 
1950s through the early 1980s present the subject of 
Russian-Jewish rivalry for a Russian woman, or a 
Russian wife who is the victim of a negative Jewish 
character. In Shevtsov's novel this rivalry comprises 
one of the central lines of the narrative. Maya 
Kaganskaya has made similar observations in her 
analysis of science fiction written by Russian 
nationalists in the 1970s through the early 1980s.28 In 
general, the sexual rivalry between Russians and 
representatives of other ethnic groups is a constant 
theme in the works of Russian nationalists, beginning 
with Valentin Ivanov, who expressed this subject so 
clearly that it attracted the attention of the Central 
Committee.
The Legend about the “Tashkent Front”
The essence of this legend holds that while all the 
peoples of the USSR—above all, Russians—were 
fighting the Fascists, the Jews sat out the war in the 
rear, busy with their “cushy jobs.” The thinking behind 
this legend maintains that the Jews were saved only 
thanks to the Russians; therefore, in the first place, the 
Jews should be eternally grateful to the Russians, and, 
second, it follows that it is inadmissible on these 
grounds to call the Russians—above all, Russian 
nationalists—“anti-Semites” or “Fascists.”
The legend about the “Tashkent Front” was widely 
disseminated throughout the Soviet Union and was in 
no way restricted to the milieu of the party-state 
apparatus. More likely than not, this myth did not come 
into being in the organs of power, although they 
certainly contributed a great deal to its formation. The 
true cause was the following: during the swift advance 
of German forces in the summer of 1941 the first to be 
evacuated were urban dwellers, approximately half of 
which in Ukrainian, Belorussian and Moldavian cities 
were Jewish.29 In the places of evacuation shelter for 
the refugees—hungry, poor and burdened with 
children—was to be rendered by a population that was 
just as poor and half-starved, which nevertheless was 
working day and night for the state. The Jewish 
evacuees with their poor Russian and “provincial”
28 M. Kaganskaia, “Mif dvadtsat' pervogo veka ili Rossiia vo mgle,” 
Strana i mir, 1 (1987), 131-40.
29 P. Polian, “Nakanune voiny i genotsida. Sovetskie evrei i perepisi 
1939 g,” Russkaia Mysl',1999, 9-15.09.
habits stood out among the urban populations of the 
Urals, Siberia and Central Asia, which had become less 
heterogeneous after the purges of the 1920s and 30s. 
Therefore, both in the Asiatic regions of the RSFSR 
and in the cities of the Central Asian republics, 
populated in this period to a large extent by people 
with Slavic ethnic origins,30 the appearance of the 
Jewish evacuees provoked a rather negative reaction.31 
Moreover, evacuated some two or three months earlier 
than residents of Central Russia, the Ukrainian, 
Belorussian and Moldavian Jews managed to find jobs 
and housing. The subsequent waves of refugees 
(primarily Russians and western Ukrainians) arrived 
when work and housing were much more difficult to 
obtain, which also fomented attacks of anti-Semitism.
Widespread anti-Semitism in the rear and the army 
in the field (through new reinforcements and soldiers 
who returned to the army after medical treatment) led 
to the formation of the persistent myth of the “Tashkent 
Front,” a myth that still has resonance today. The 
regime, for its part, in the framework of the long-term 
anti-Semitic campaign begun in 1942, kept silent about 
the role of Jews in the war, despite the fact that on 
many counts (the number of recipients of awards, the 
number of Heroes of the Soviet Union, the number of 
generals32) Jews, not counting assimilated Jews and 
those who were registered as Russians, in a rather 
strange contest for collective contribution to the 
Victory over the Germans according to ethnic origin 
held fourth place among all peoples of the USSR.33
Russian nationalists made the most of the legend 
about the “Tashkent Front.” In Shevtsov's novel one 
Jewish character makes the following comment: “You, 
Borya, fought the war in Tashkent.”34 Ivanov went 
much further and accused the Jews, to a man, of hiding 
from the war in the rear and engaging in illegal 
commercial dealings, as well as creating a secret 
network that worked for the Fascists. Should they be 
exposed, they supposedly were able to buy themselves 
freedom, after paying somebody from Beria's circle.
The members of the Russian nationalist movement 
elaborated this legend, using it both to deny the facts of 
anti-Semitism in the USSR and at the same time to 
repudiate accusations aimed at themselves. Moreover, 
this was accomplished by knowingly juggling the facts.
30 Slavs numerically predominated in the populations of three of the 
five capitals of Central Asian republics: Alma-Ata, Ashkhabad and 
Frunze. Their percentage of the population was high as well in
Tashkent and Dushanbe, and other major cities, for example,
Chimkent, Samarkand, Fergana and Leninabad.
31 G. Kostyrchenko, “V plenu u krasnogo faraona,” 15-16.
32 On May 15, 1945, 102 generals of the front-line army forces were 
Jewish. Compare: 2272 Russians, 286 Ukrainians, 157 Belorussians, 
25 Armenians, 19Latvians, 17 Poles, Tatars and Georgians, 12 each. 
Istochnik, 2 (1996):148.
33 G. Kostyrchenko, V plenu u krasnogo faraona, 20.
34 Shevtsov, 86.
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The Soviet army turned out to be the savior of the 
Jews, although clearly it had at no time set itself that as 
an objective, but was defending the territorial integrity 
of the country and the existing political system. For 
example, N. Starshinov, a member of the Russian 
nationalist movement, refutes Yevgeny Yevtushenko 
with the following words: “And this is written about 
that very same army, three-fourths of which was 
comprised of Russian soldiers, which saved the Jews 
from complete annihilation by Hitler's forces!”35
Legends about Pseudonyms
and the “Doctors-Assassins”
The essence of the legend about pseudonyms 
maintains that Jews are playing a dishonest game by 
adopting Russian surnames or neutral pseudonyms, in 
order to push through their own agenda. If they had not 
adopted pseudonyms, then “Russian people” would 
know who the real author of these ideas was.
The roots of the legend about pseudonyms go back 
to the late 1930s, when Jews who worked as journalists 
in the central media were forced to adopt Russian 
pseudonyms.36 In the second half of the 1940s and the 
early 1950s, concurrent with the campaign for 
exposing pseudonyms in the literary world, more and 
more Jews working in various fields were compelled to 
adopt pseudonyms or change their names, as well as 
the names of their children, to neutral or Slavic 
surnames. This was particularly true for those families 
who had assimilated or who were striving for that, 
since being able to keep a prestigious job, enrolling in 
an institution of higher learning, and later, the 
opportunity to travel abroad all depended on having the 
“correct and proper” surname, name and patronymic.
The legend about pseudonyms permitted the 
members of the Russian nationalist movement to 
accuse any person (as a rule, behind his/her back) of 
being a “hidden” Jew, and to give his name a “Jewish” 
accent (for example, Mikhail Posokhin, the chief 
architect of Moscow, was called “Peisokhin”).
The legend about the “doctors-assassins” (who 
supposedly poisoned Stalin) came into being 
immediately after Stalin's death. In essence, it repeats 
the propagandistic purposes from the period of the 
Doctors' Plot now extrapolated to include Stalin's 
death. As far as public opinion was concerned, as well 
as officialdom, the public declaration of the doctors' 
innocence and the revocation of the honors awarded to 
the plot's detector effectively put an end to this story.
35 N. Starshinov, Chto bylo, to bylo... (Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG,
1998), 370.
36 B. Efimov, Moi vek (Moscow: Agraf, 1998), 147. This practice 
continued much later as well. About similar precedents in the
editorial staff of Komsomol'skaia Pravda in the 1960s, see my
interview with V. Borshchov.
The legend, however, continued to live on among a 
certain segment of committed Russian nationalists. 
Moreover, the legend underwent a transformation—the 
accent was shifted from the deaths of the unpopular 
and quickly forgotten Zhdanov and Shcherbakov (of 
which the “poisoners” had been accused) to the violent 
death of Stalin, the beloved idol of the majority of the 
Russian nationalists.
The Legend about the Jewish Revolutionaries
In the second half of the 1960s, after the swift rise 
of anti-Communist and pro-monarchy fractions in the 
Russian nationalist movement (which included a 
significant number of officials from the Central 
Committee of the KPSS, the All-Union Lenin Young 
Communist League and the Soviet of Ministers of the 
RSFSR), a new legend about the Jewish revolutionaries 
took hold and was gradually disseminated throughout 
the party apparatus. According to this legend, the 
Jewish revolutionaries supposedly acted to further their 
own mystical and selfish interests by demolishing the 
Russian Empire; moreover, they were and remain 
committed to the destruction of Russian culture as a 
whole. The point behind this legend is that all 
responsibility for the negative and bloody episodes in 
the Revolution is firmly placed on the Jews, while the 
Russian people are given the role of innocent victim 
who has been deceived.
The legend about the Jewish revolutionaries was
borrowed from Russian emigre writings of the 1930s 
and partly from Nazi propaganda as well. Literature, 
for example, Andrei Dikii's Jews in the USSR, was 
actively brought into the Soviet Union by the artist Ilya 
Glazunov, well-known advocate of Orthodox and pro­
monarchy views, and later by others in his circle. 
Former emigrants, who by various paths found 
themselves in the USSR and after 1955 gradually 
regained their freedom, became another source. For 
example, V. Shulgin, who in the 1960s and 70s had 
become an object of pilgrimage for members of the 
Russian nationalist movement, and A. Kazem-Bek, 
who voluntarily returned to the USSR in 1948 and for 
many years worked on the editorial board of the 
Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. Nazi sources 
were studied in the libraries by such young scholars as
S. Semanov and V. Skurlatov.
The Myth about the Russian State
Apart from the myth about Jews, other myths had 
currency among the Russian nationalists, myths that 
had no connection with the Jewish problem, for 
example, the racist myth about the Russian state. 
According to this myth, the USSR is the legitimate heir 
to the Russian Empire, a state created by ethnic 
Russians—for ethnic Russians. In accordance with this
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myth only ethnic Russians have the right to rule this 
state at the present time, and they should comprise, at 
the very least, the “qualified majority” in all prestigious 
spheres, including government, defense, trade and 
science. In every concrete case, faced with the choice 
of giving an important position to a Russian or to a 
person of different ethnic background, preference 
should be given to the “creator of the state.” (There 
exists a variant of this system, by which representation 
is determined by the percentage of the ethnic group in 
the general population.)
The myth about the Russian state clearly runs 
counter not only to historical fact, but also to the 
principles of the Russian Empire, in which relations 
with its citizens was determined in accordance with 
their loyalty and creed. However, by the 1950s 
memory of the polyethnic elite in the governmental 
bureaucracy of the Russian Empire no longer existed. 
Young bureaucrats, and even the intellectuals, believed 
in the Stalinist propaganda that had been fed to them as 
children and adolescents in the second half of the 
1930s through the 1950s, propaganda that affirmed the 
priority of the ethnic Russian factor.
The Myth about Stalin
The myth about Stalin represented one part of the 
fundamentally statist consciousness of the Russian 
nationalists. The myth goes something like this: Joseph 
Stalin was a great leader, who built a mighty state in a 
history-breaking short span of time. He loved the 
Russian people boundlessly, and he fought against the 
Jews. The sense behind the myth is that a leader like 
Stalin is what's needed at the present time.
The myth about Stalin came into being among the 
young officials who entered the Central Committee in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s (A. Shelepin's group, 
for example). They were treated with affection by 
Stalin and retained their attachment for him, despite 
Khrushchev's revelations. It would still take rather a 
long time to convince some of the soundness of the 
myth about Stalin, for example, the Russian 
nationalists who had not gone through the school of the 
party-state apparatus, the young humanities students of 
the mid-1950s, and the “village” school of the 1960s. If 
such a figure as Ivan Shevtsov, who had connections 
with the highest echelons of Stalinist elite culture, 
represents a highly placed government official who 
illustrates the myth about Stalin, a father bequeathing 
his daughter with the duty to continue the struggle with 
the abstractionists and the Jews, then Valentin Ivanov 
is clearly an anti-Communist who reduces the 
Caucasian Stalin to the role of a Georgian rascal who 
seduced girls visiting on holiday. However, in the 
course of the second half of the 1950s through the early 
1980s the influence of the myth about Stalin gained 
more and more momentum; as a result, for all practical
purposes it supplanted the initial anti-Stalinist views 
held by a segment of the Russian nationalists. In this 
myth Stalin as a statesman appeared to be stronger and 
more effective than the present leaders, while the 
“individual mistakes” about which his Central 
Committee and Glavlit (the censorship) kept their 
silence, looked insignificant when compared to the 
obvious defects of the Brezhnev government.
The collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring 
about a significant change in the worldview of the 
former party and state bureaucrats. Only a handful of 
them were able to look at their past actions with 
different eyes and repent that they had been rather big 
cogs in the machine of a heartless government. The 
overwhelming majority of the former high state 
officials, if they did not retire, accepted the new rules 
of the game, without truly comprehending the crux of 
the matter in the changes that had taken place.
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